The Case for Tradable Tax Credits by Wallace, Clint
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
Fall 2011 
The Case for Tradable Tax Credits 
Clint Wallace 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
THE CASE FOR TRADABLE TAX CREDITS
CLINTON G. WALLACE*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 228
II. BACKGROUND ON TRADABLE TAX CREDITS ......... 236
A. Defining the Tradable Tax Credit ............. 236
B. Examples of Existing or Previous Tradable Tax
Credits .. ............................... 237
1. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit ....... 238
2. The New Markets Tax Credit ............. 242
3. Safe Harbor Leasing ... ................ 244
4. Other Tradable Tax Credits .............. 246
III. THE CASE FOR TRADABLE TAX CREDITS........... .. 247
A. Tradable Tax Credits Are Economically
Equivalent to Refundable Tax Credits .......... 247
5. Direct Subsidy Example ................. 250
6. Refundable Tax Credit Example............ 251
7. Tradable Tax Credit Example............ 252
B. Efficiency Advantages of Tradable Tax Credits 253
1. Analysis of the Universal Efficiency of
Tradable Tax Credits .................... 254
a. Benefit (Be) of Tradable Tax Credits
to Third Parties.................. 256
b. Smoothing Income Shocks and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations........ 260
2. Analysis of the Technical Efficiency of
Tradable Tax Credits . ................. 262
C. Political Advantages of Tradable Tax Credits ... 268
1. Broad Political Constituencies............ 269
2. Ease of Enactment as Compared to Direct
Spending ... ....................... 271
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, New York University School of Law; A.B., 2004,
Princeton University. The author would like to thank ProfessorJoshua Blank
for providing invaluable guidance on all sorts of school and career issues,
including helping get this note started, editing and advising throughout the
writing process; Rachel Beller, Daniel Friedman, Moshe Schwartz and the
rest of the Journal of Law & Business editors who shepherded this project
from start to finish; and Jenna Wallace, Raven McCrory, Bruce Wallace and
Nick Wallace for thinking through these issues and providing thorough and
conscientious editing. All errors are the author's own.
227
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
D. The Fairness of Tradable Tax Credits........... 273
IV. TRADABLE CREDITS IN PRACTICE .................. 276
V. CONCLUSION .................................... 278
I.
INTRODUCTION
The federal tax system has long been a major tool for im-
plementing social policy and shaping the nation's economy.
The tax system influences decisions about investing and bor-
rowing, owning a home, procuring health care services and in-
surance, supporting charitable organizations. There are nu-
merous mechanisms used to implement policy through the In-
ternal Revenue Code: special rates, deductions, credits, and so
on.
In recent years, academics have provided much favorable
analysis of refundable tax credits. However, academics have
paid almost no attention to a similar device - the tradable tax
credit. Tradable tax credits are a form of tax incentive de-
signed to facilitate the exchange of the value of a tax credit
between taxpaying entities. Such an exchange allows a tax-
payer with no tax liability to sell a tax credit to a taxpayer with
tax liability who can take advantage of the tax credit. The
tradability thus allows the qualifying taxpaying entity to recog-
nize the benefits of tax incentives for which it is eligible re-
gardless of tax liability. In contrast, with a non-tradable tax
credit, in order to take advantage of the incentive - and thus
fulfill the government policy objective - a taxpaying entity
must have tax liability against which to offset the credit
amount. Refundable tax credits achieve the same effect as
tradable tax credits,' but the refundable mechanism requires
the government to make direct payments; tradable credits
avoid direct expenditures by the government.
Although often controversial, implementing social and ec-
onomic policy through the tax code makes sense in some situ-
ations. If the government wants to induce activities that create
positive externalities, 2 the tax code provides an easy way, often
1. See infra Part III.A. A refundable tax credit involves the government
making direct payments to a taxpayer if necessary so that the taxpayer re-
ceives the benefit of a credit regardless of tax liability.
2. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WiLLAM D. NoRDI-IAus, EcoNOMics 36
(16th ed. 1995) ("Externalities (or spillover effects) occur when firms or
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with minimal implementation costs, to reach many people.
But traditional tax policy tools raise a host of problems. De-
ductions, which are not uniform across income levels, may be
inefficient and inequitable.3 For example, the home interest
mortgage deduction is far more beneficial in absolute dollar
terms to income earners in higher marginal tax brackets than
it is to those in lower tax brackets.4 Tax credits that are
nonrefundable result in behavioral distortions and inequity by
only being fully available to taxpayers with federal tax liability.5
If the government decides to incentivize an activity by provid-
ing a $1,000 nonrefundable tax credit, only those taxpayers
with at least $1,000 of tax liability will receive the full incentive;
everyone else receives some lesser amount that may not be
enough to spur the desired activity. Refundable tax credits re-
quire direct government payments that may be politically un-
palatable.6 For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit
people impose costs or benefits on others outside the marketplace."). Exter-
nalities thus "involve involuntary imposition of costs or benefits." Id. A posi-
tive externality provides a benefit to society, so the government may want to
induce actions that yield positive externalities. One basic example of a posi-
tive externality is associated with the use of deodorant: the consumer of deo-
dorant benefits from the product, and others around the consumer receive a
benefit as well.
3. See infra Parts III.B & III.D. Deductions reduce reported gross income
(above the line deductions reduce gross income which yields adjusted gross
income; below the line deductions and exemptions reduce adjusted gross
income to yield taxable income).
4. If a taxpayer has $50,000 of gross income and makes $5,000 of inter-
est payments on a qualifying mortgage loan, the taxpayer can take a below
the line deduction of $5,000, resulting in taxable income of $45,000. A tax-
payer with $50,000 of income is in the 25% bracket, so the $5,000 deduction
reduces his tax liability by $1,250. A taxpayer with $200,000 of income is in
the 33% bracket, so if he makes the same $5,000 of interest payments the
deduction would reduce his tax liability by $1,650.
5. In contrast to refundable tax credits, nonrefundable tax credits are
limited by the tax liability of the beneficiary. For example, the Plug-In Elec-
tric Vehicle Credit, I.R.C. §§ 30 and 30D, provides a credit of $2,500 for the
purchase of certain electric vehicles. Because the credit is nonrefundable, a
taxpayer who has tax liability of $2,000 will only be able to take advantage of
the tax credit to the extent of that tax liability. The incentive value of the
$500 difference between the value of the credit and the taxpayer's tax liabil-
ity disappears.
6. See infra Part III.C.
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(EITC)7 has raised the ire of fiscally conservative politicians
who view the payments as handouts and are leery of fraud and
abuse.8
The tradable tax credit arrangement has received little at-
tention from policymakers or academics beyond narrow criti-
ques of enacted provisions. Currently existing tradable tax
credits include the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC)' and the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC).' 0 Addi-
tionally, the safe harbor leasing provisions, a complex form of
tradable tax credit," were enacted and quickly repealed in the
early 1980s. Refundable tax credits, on the other hand, have
wide support in academic circles. 12 This paper argues that the
7. The EITC is an anti-poverty program that provides income assistance
to the working poor through a refundable tax credit. If the filer of a tax
return qualifies for the EITC, the IRS will apply the credit to offset any tax
liability, and then will make a payment to the taxpayer for the credit amount
that exceeds tax liability. If the filer has zero tax liability, the IRS makes a
direct payment to the filer for the amount of the credit as if it were the
refund of excess tax amounts paid.
8. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S4,626 (daily ed. July 18, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Kyl) ("How fair is that, when the bottom 50 percent pay nothing and all
of them receive benefits from the government and 30 percent of them re-
ceive an EITC benefit or payments back from the government in some other
form, directly to them."); 149 Cong. Rec. H5,588 (daily ed. June 19, 2003)
(statement of Rep. Portman) ("We now have a 30 percent error rate [with
the EITC], we are told by GAO. It was 25 percent the last time I looked. Now
they say it is 30 percent. Even 25 percent, that is wholly unacceptable. I think
that is agreed to, I would hope, on both sides of the aisle. A 25, 30 percent
error rate, we are talking about $10 billion a year is mispaid under the EITC
.... I would love to hear the ideas from the other side of the aisle as to what
they would do about this. I think this is one where if continue to ignore it
[sic], continue to say no, we are going to tie the IRS's hands, even when they
show flexibility as to how they are going to deal with it, what is going to
happen? You are going to lose tremendous support for the EITC.").
9. See infra Part II.B.1.
10. See infra Part II.B.2.
11. See infra Part II.B.3.
12. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (2006);John M. de Figueiredo &
Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 591, 595 (2005) (advo-
cating for a refundable tax credit to encourage contributions to political
campaigns); Jonathan Barry Forman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax Credit
Proposal: Towards a Comprehensive System of Tax Credits to Help Low-Income Fami-
lies with Children, 38 Emory L.J. 661, 663 (1989) (proposing various refund-
able tax credits to benefit children in low-income families); Sean M. Steg-
maier, Tax Incentives for Higher Education in the Internal Revenue Code: Education
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federal government should make use of tradable tax credits to
induce certain behaviors that create positive externalities be-
cause tradable tax credits, if properly structured and imple-
mented, can offer benefits of efficiency, equity and political
feasibility that are not available with other types of tax incen-
tives.
The current political dynamics may facilitate the first
broad-based tax reform effort in a quarter century; as such,
serious reconsideration of the efficiency, equity and political
feasibility of tax incentives is an important and timely under-
taking. The generally cacophonous debate about whether and
how to reform the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) has found
some harmony of late, with policymakers across the political
spectrum agreeing in broad terms that the I.R.C. must be sim-
plified and made more efficient, and soon. 13 However, there
remains substantial disagreement among various factions of
scholars, commentators and policymakers as to the goals of
the tax system, and how it should accomplish those goals.
Some argue that the tax system should be focused on levying
taxes sufficient for government operations while maintaining
minimal interference in economic activity. Others see the tax
system as a way to achieve distributional goals. Still others be-
lieve that the I.R.C. provides fertile ground to promote poli-
cies that would otherwise be carried out via direct expendi-
tures.
A central front in this ideological battle is the appropri-
ateness and wisdom of "tax expenditures." Tax expenditures
are special provisions in the I.R.C. that look similar to spend-
ing programs except that they are achieved by targeted reduc-
tions in revenues collected rather than through actual govern-
Tax Expenditure Reform and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits, 37 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 135 (2008) (advocating refundable tax credits as the most efficient way
to incentivize pursuing higher education).
13. See, e.g., Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Mo-
ment of Truth: Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/news; Biparti-
san Policy Center Debt Reduction Task Force, Restoring America's Future:
Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple,
Pro-Growth Tax System (Nov. 2010), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/projects/
debt-initiative/about. One common theme in proposals for decreasing com-
plexity and increasing efficiency is to broaden the tax base, which could be
achieved in part by removing tax expenditures.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
2011] 231
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
ment outlays. 1 4 Deductions, exemptions and credits, including
tradable tax credits, are all types of tax expenditures. A para-
digmatic example of a tax expenditure is the deduction for
interest payments on home mortgages.15 These payments are a
deviation from the normative income tax in that mortgage in-
terest is a form of personal consumption, so should be in-
cluded in income. Mortgage interest is the only type of interest
payment that is deductible by individuals, and no other hous-
ing payments (for example, rent payments) are deductible.
The home mortgage interest deduction creates a significant
government incentive for people to take out mortgage loans to
buy homes, rather than paying in full or renting, and creates
an incentive for people to borrow for home purchases rather
than for other types of purchases.
Most reasonable assessments of the prospects of so-called
"fundamental tax reform" allow that the tax expenditures in
the current code will, at least to some extent, persist. 16 This
paper will not address the broader tax reform discussion, but
rather will assume that the tax code will continue to be used to
achieve policy objectives that might otherwise be carried out
via direct expenditures. There is some general agreement
across the policymaking spectrum as to how to structure tax
incentives: exclusions, exemptions and deductions are appro-
priate tools to accurately measure income;1 7 in contrast, tax
14. In technical terms, tax expenditures are deviations from the norma-
tive income tax that result in foregone governmental revenues. See STANLEY
S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAx EXPENDITURES (1985).
15. For an example of how the home mortgage interest deduction works,
see supra note 4.
16. For example, compare the George W. Bush administration panel, PREs-
IDENT's ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAx REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSAL-S To FIX AMERICA'S TAx SYSTEM (2005), which suggested maintain-
ing various exclusions, deductions, and credits, with the Obama panel, NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON FIscAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, supra note 13,
which does the same. Across the political spectrum, certain tax expenditures
are accepted as an inexorable feature of the tax code. It is also worth noting
that a variety of tax expenditures persisted through the 1986 tax reform ef-
forts, despite coming under fire before and during that effort. See Edward A.
Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64
Tex. L. Rev. 973, 976 (1986) ("A surprisingly large number of provisions
considered tax expenditures by the Treasury have survived tax reform in
whole or in part.").
17. The term "measure" is used in tax analysis because income should
not necessarily include all accretions of wealth. For example, I.R.C.
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credits are appropriate to incentivize behavior.18 There is also
general agreement on two further propositions.'1 First, that
tax incentives should be structured to be efficient, minimizing
deadweight loss from market interference,20 and giving taxpay-
ers the most bang for their buck. Second, that fairness is a key
concern in creating tax expenditures, as it is with any tax pro-
vision.21
Professor Lily Batchelder, along with former IRS Commis-
sioner Fred Goldberg and economist Peter Orszag (hereinaf-
ter "Batchelder") have argued that for efficiency reasons the
default form for behavior-inducing tax incentives should be
the refundable tax credit.22 The Batchelder article makes the
convincing case that refundable tax credits are the most effi-
cient form of tax incentive.23
Batchelder assumes that elasticity of behavior (that is, the pro-
pensity of a taxpaying entity to change its behavior given a
change in the cost of the behavior) and the level of marginal
externalities (the positive externalities created by a change in
§ 62(a) (1) provides for an above the line deduction for certain business ex-
penses because accretions of wealth should be reduced by the costs of pro-
ducing that wealth and thus business expenses should not be included in
taxable income if "meaured" appropriately.
18. See Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 556-58
(2008) (arguing that credits are preferable to deductions and exclusions to
incentivize behavior); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM 134-36
(1974).
19. See LAURIE L. MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 8 (2d ed. 2002).
20. Deadweight loss is defined as "the loss of economic welfare arising
from distortions in prices and output such as those due to monopoly, taxa-
tion, tariffs or quota." SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 2, at 198.
21. See infra Part III.D. There are two complementary (and somewhat
overlapping) ways to gauge fairness of the federal income tax: vertical equity
and horizontal equity. Vertical equity is an assessment of whether taxpayers
with greater income pay greater amounts of tax. Horizontal equity is an as-
sessment of whether taxpayers with the same amount of income pay the
same amount of tax. See generally MICHAELJ. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28-29 (6th ed. 2009).
22. Batchelder et al., supra note 12.
23. Batchelder has a narrow focus, seeking to determine "how to effi-
ciently structure a tax incentive intended to encourage behavior generating
positive externalities, assuming some type of tax incentive has been deemed
appropriate". Id. at 26. Batchelder sets aside "concerns about institutional
comparative advantage, political process, and. . . distributive justice". Id. at
31.
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behavior) do not change with income level. As long as there is
no evidence to alter those two assumptions, the authors find
that uniform subsidies minimize the efficiency losses society
bears from behavior distortions.
Credits and, in particular, refundable credits, Batchelder ar-
gues, ensure uniformity. Unlike deductions, credits do not re-
sult in cliff effects at points where marginal tax rates change. 24
For example, a credit is worth the same amount to a taxpayer
in the 33% bracket as it is to a person in the 28% bracket; with
deductions, taxpayers with different marginal tax rates will re-
ceive varying benefits. Thus a credit creates a uniform subsidy
whereas a deduction does not. Similarly, refundability ensures
uniformity without a cliff effect for taxpayers with zero tax lia-
bility. That is, where one taxpayer has zero tax liability and
another has ample tax liability, the subsidy provided by a
nonrefundable tax credit is not uniform between the two tax-
payers. Refundability addresses that issue, providing the same
subsidy to each regardless of tax liability. Refundable tax cred-
its provide additional efficiency advantages beyond
nonrefundable tax credits as well, by smoothing household in-
come shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations.25 Batchelder
finds that efficiency justifies the use of uniform refundable tax
credits as the form of tax expenditure to incentivize socially
desirable behaviors. The authors' conclusion comports with
the longstanding academic preference for refundable credits
on equity and simplicity grounds described briefly above, and
it has been widely referenced in academic circles.26
But this academic agreement as to the most efficient and
equitable form of tax expenditure has not resonated with poli-
ticians and policymakers. Tax incentives remain an inscrutable
24. A "cliff effect" exists where a small economic difference results in a
significant variation in tax treatment. For example, if a tax provision allowed
that anyone with an income less than $100,000 can take a $1,000 deduction,
but anyone with an income greater than $100,000 cannot, there would be a
cliff effect at an income of around $100,000. Taxpayers on one side of the
cliff (who are covered by the provision) would have a very different tax result
than those on the other side of the cliff (who are not covered by the provi-
sion).
25. See infra Part III.B.1.ii.
26. See, e.g., Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 12; Miranda Perry Fleischer,
Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. REv. 165
(2008); Forman, supra note 12; Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global La-
bor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1540 (2009); Stegmaier, supra note 12.
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hodgepodge of the various forms of deviations from the nor-
mative income tax (deductions, exemptions, credits), with
seemingly little regard for the efficiency or equity of one form
versus another. At key moments when tax incentive provisions
have been created or amended, factors aside from academic
assessments of sound policy have driven the structure of the
expenditure.27 Alternative policy prescriptions are needed to
bridge the gap between normative academic conclusions and
political realities.
This paper makes the case that tradable credits can sur-
pass the efficiency benefits of refundable tax credits detailed
by Batchelder while also providing political advantages that re-
fundable credits cannot offer, and while matching the fairness
of refundable tax credits. This analysis suggests certain forms
of government incentives should be enacted from within the
tax code as tradable tax credits.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Part II pro-
vides an overview of previously enacted, currently existing and
proposed tradable tax credits. Part III shows that tradable tax
credits can exceed the efficiency benefits of refundable cred-
its, and examines the features of tradable tax credits that can
make them a desirable policy tool from fairness and political
perspectives. Part IV briefly considers tradable tax credits in
practice, including concerns about tradable credits and cir-
cumstances in which tradable credits can be a useful alterna-
tive to other forms of government intervention. Throughout
the paper, other types of government incentives, most often
27. The structures of some of the largest existing tax expenditures are
explained by happenstance, path dependency, and the power of the status
quo in federal policymaking. For example, the exclusion for employer-based
health insurance is described as a "historical accident" given that employer-
based health insurance emerged as a method for employers to get around
wage controls put in place during World War II, and the exclusion was en-
acted in response to this practice. See Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insur-
ance in the United States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6 Houst. J.
Health L. & Pol'y 1, 10-11 (2005). Similarly, the home mortgage interest
deduction is a holdover from the time when deductions were permitted for
all interest on money borrowed for personal consumption. See William T.
Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 43, 45-48 (1996) (describing the historical backdrop to
the 1986 tax reform act, which eliminated deductions for personal interest,
but, in the interest of promoting home ownership, created an exception for
interest on home mortgages).
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refundable tax credits, are used as a point of comparison to
highlight the relative advantages and disadvantages of tradable
tax credits.
II.
BACKGROUND ON TRADABLE TAX CREDITS
A. Defining the Tradable Tax Credit
For the purposes of this paper, a tradable tax credit 28 is a
tax credit that may be conferred on a taxpaying entity other
than the entity that qualifies for the benefit, thus allowing the
qualifying entity to monetize the benefit.29 Tradable tax cred-
28. "Tradable tax credit" is the most frequently used term to describe the
tax incentive mechanism that is the focus of this paper. Other literature has
used the terms "transferable tax credit" and "investable tax credit." See, e.g.,
Mihir Desai, Dhammika Dharmapala & Monica Singhal, Investable Tax Cred-
its: The Case of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (Harvard Kennedy Sch.
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Paper No. RWP08-035, 2008), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1150302.
29. Cf Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 33 ("For purposes of our dis-
cussion, a refundable tax credit has four elements. It is a tax credit that is:
(1) located in the federal income tax code, (2) administered in whole or in
part through the tax system, (3) intended to induce certain behavior, and
(4) 'refundable,' meaning that it is paid in cash when a tax unit has no
federal income tax liability to offset (although frequently the claimant will
have positive tax liability when other federal, state, and local taxes are taken
into account.)"). The focus here is on the federal tax code, although there
are a number of state-level tradable tax credits, see, e.g., THE PENNSYLVANIA
AccouNrANT, A Guide to Pennsylvania Transferable Tax Credits 8-9 (Fall 2007)
(describing state improvement zone tax credits, research and development
tax credits and film tax credits, all of which are tradable); Paul Rothstein &
Nathan Wineinger, Transferable Tax Credits in Missouri: An Analytical Review,
REGIONAL EcoNoMic DEVELOPMENT 53 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
2007) (describing six transferable state tax credits, and noting that 30 tax
credits are deemed transferable but may require further authorization by
the state legislature). The policy rationales discussed here apply equally at
the state level, and in particular the political dynamics discussed below may
be of interest to state policymakers. Additionally, states often follow on fed-
eral tax policy. For example, the federal Earned Income Tax Credit has
spawned numerous state versions of the program that use federal qualifying
guidelines. TAx POLIcY CENTER, State EITC Based on the Federal EITC, http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=293 (last visited
April 15, 2011). Sixteen states have enacted state Low-Income Housing Tax
Credits, discussed in Part II.B.1, since the federal credit was created. Desai et
al., supra note 28, at 2 n.2. Similarly, shortly after the creation of the New
Markets Tax Credit, discussed in Part II.B.2, Louisiana created a state-level
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its are typically intended to induce behaviors that generate
positive externalities. This paper will not address the wisdom
of judgments regarding what behaviors should be induced or
are induced by government incentives. Rather, it assumes that
policymakers can identify certain activities that generate posi-
tive externalities, and that without some form of government
intervention these externalities will not be internalized and
welfare gains30 will not be realized. When such externality-cre-
ating-behaviors exist, the most efficient government policy is
to target incentives to entities whose behavior is most elastic
and who will therefore create the greatest positive externalities
for the least cost.3 ' However Batchelder submits that "the most
reasonable and parsimonious default assumptions are that un-
derlying price elasticities and behavior do not vary systemati-
cally across income distribution... [and] in the absence of any
other knowledge or evidence, [those] default assumptions
provide the best practical guide for policymakers." 32 This pa-
per proceeds on the same assumption.
B. Examples of Existing or Previous Tradable Tax Credits
There are a small number of tradable tax credits currently
in effect, and others that were previously enacted but have
been repealed. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) and the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) are the
two existing tradable tax credits. The safe harbor leasing provi-
sions of the early 1980s notoriously met a quick demise. Each
is discussed in turn below.
NMTC. Michael J. Novogradac, Update on the New Markets Tax Credit, 12 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNTY DEv. L. 447, 456 (Summer 2003).
30. Samuelson and Nordhaus observe that "[a]n economy is efficient
when it provides its consumers with the most desired set of goods and ser-
vices, given the resources and technology of the economy." SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUs, supra note 2, at 185. This paper will assume such efficiency is the
goal of policymakers. This outcome may be said to maximize welfare, which
in this context refers to the overall utility achieved by an economy (rather
than "welfare" in the sense of a social program). See also infra note 106 and
accompanying discussion.
31. See Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 27-28 n. 15, 16.
32. Id. at n.16.
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1. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
The LIHTC is an incentive for the development of low-
income housing. The LIHTC provides a credit of 70% of the
eligible basis for new buildings, and 30% of the eligible basis
of renovated or repurposed buildings.33 The eligible basis is
the amount the developer spends on depreciable construction
costs. 3 4 The credit is provided to the developer over a ten-year
period, generally starting when the housing units are com-
pleted and put into service.35 The housing must serve a popu-
lation that conforms to one of two statutory definitions of low-
income: either 20 percent of the residential units must be
rent-restricted and occupied by individuals whose income is 50
percent or less of median gross income in the area, or 40 per-
cent of the units must be rent-restricted and occupied by indi-
viduals whose income is 60 percent or less of the median gross
income in the area.3 6 Additionally, the building must be sub-
ject to a "long-term commitment" to low-income housing.37
This means that for a period of not less than 15 years (and
perhaps more, at the discretion of the state housing author-
ity), the building must serve the low-income population de-
fined above.38 Credits are allocated by the IRS on a state-by-
state basis according to a formula within the I.R.C.,39 with state
housing agencies selecting developers and projects to which
the credits are provided.40
33. I.R.C. § 42(b).
34. See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LIHTC
BAsics: CALCULATING THE QUALIFIED BASis, available at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/web/lihtc/calculating/qualified
basis.cfm (most, but not all depreciable constructions costs count towards
the eligible basis).
35. I.R.C. § 42(f)(1).
36. I.R.C. § 42 (g) (1).
37. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6).
38. I.R.C. § 42(h) (6) (D). See also Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in
the Tax Code: the Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 878 n. 37
(1993) ("This extended low-income housing commitment is an agreement
with respect to the property, recorded pursuant to state law as a restrictive
covenant, that requires the appropriate percentage of the building to re-
main available as rent-restricted units for low-income occupancy. Individuals
who meet the income limitation applicable to the building ... have the right
to enforce this agreement in state court.").
39. I.R.C. § 42(h) (3).
40. Desai et al., supra note 28, at 3, 5.
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There are three provisions in the I.R.C. that work in con-
junction to make LIHTCs tradable. First, as described above,
the credits are provided to the owner of a qualifying building,
and there are rules that allow the credits to survive transfers of
ownership. 41 Second, partnership tax rules allow that tax cred-
its may be allocated to partners based either on the "distribu-
tive share" of such credits, or as allocated by the partnership
agreement.4 2 Third, the rules which generally limit the use of
partnerships to take advantage of losses and tax credits arising
from "passive activities" are waived for LIHTCs.43 Together,
these provisions allow for partnership structures in which a de-
veloper is the general partner responsible for the project and
investors are limited partners who can use the LIHTCs to off-
set unrelated tax liability. 44 Each investor then receives and
can use the benefits of the tax credits in proportion to their
stake in the partnership, and can sell their share of the part-
nership freely (subject to limitations in the partnership agree-
ment).
Tradability is a key aspect of the LIHTC. Developers need
capital at the outset in order to fund the building of the units,
not spread over the ten year period once the building is in
service during which the credit is made available from the gov-
41. I.R.C. § 42(d) (7) provides that any taxpayer who acquires a building
that qualified for LIHTCs under the prior owner can collect credits in the
amount that the prior owner would have been able to collect. Additionally,
I.R.C. § 42 (f) (4) allows for allocation between multiple parties if an interest
in a building that qualifies for a credit is transferred: each party receives a
portion, determined by the number of days of ownership during the tax
year, of their share of the credit for the year. Note that when the LIHTC was
initially enacted, tradability was significantly restricted because the recapture
provisions were triggered by any transfer of ownership unless a bond suffi-
cient to ensure future compliance (though this standard was never defined)
was posted with the IRS. MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE ON THE Low-IN-
COME HOUSING TAX CREDIT, REPORT OF THE MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK
FORCE ON THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAx CREDIT 31 (1989).
42. I.R.C. §§ 704(a)-(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
43. I.R.C. § 469(i) (6) (defining an "active participation" requirement for
claiming losses and credits for rental real estate activity carried on through a
partnership, whereby no losses or credits may be claimed if the taxpayer
holds an interest of less than ten percent of the value; however credits deter-
mined under I.R.C. § 42 are specifically exempted).
44. See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, LIHTC
BASICS: SYNDICATION, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/afforda-
blehousing/training/web/lihtc/basics/syndication.cfm.
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emnment.45 Tradability allows investors to purchase rights to
the LIHTCs yielded by a development, and the capital the in-
vestors provide is used to fund the construction of the housing
project. Tradability is also important because many low-in-
come housing developers are not-for-profit organizations that
cannot take advantage of federal tax credits.46
The LIHTC was first enacted as a last minute addition to
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, partially in response to then-re-
cent cuts in direct subsidies for public housing. 47 In 1986, con-
struction of federally funded multi-family units dropped below
20,000 for the first time in the history of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, following steep cuts in Sec-
tion 8 New Construction funding at the urging of the Republi-
can administration.4 8 There is no indication in the congres-
sional debates leading to enactment of the 1986 tax reform act
as to why the LIHTC was added to the bill and who was behind
it. It is theorized that, in addition to filling the gap in low-
income housing, the LIHTC acted as a replacement of sorts
for the tax shelters for individuals that had been eliminated by
the passive loss provisions. 4 9
Initially the credit was modest both in scope and longev-
ity, and the tax benefits were intended flow to individual tax-
payers rather than institutional investors. But in 1989, a bipar-
tisan collaboration between Senators Danforth and Mitchell
led to the reauthorization, expansion and extension of the
LIHTC program.50 The policymakers behind the LIHTC con-
45. Id.
46. See generally Megan J. Ballard, Profiting from Poverty: The Competition Be-
tween For-Profit and Non-Profit Developers for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, 55
HASTINGs L.J. 211, 224 (2003). Indeed, Congress requires that ten percent of
LIHTCs be allocated to projects carried out by nonprofit developers. I.R.C.
§ 42(h) (5) (A) (2009).
47. Doug Guthrie & Michael McQuarrie, Privatization and the Social Con-
tract: Corporate Welfare and Low-Income Housing in the United States Since 1986,
14 RES. POL. Soc. 15 (2005), available at http://www.hbs.edu/socialenter-
prise/pdf/LIHTCpolitics9.0.pdf.
48. Id.
49. See id. See also GRAETZ & SCHENK supra note 21, at 414-15 (describing
efforts in the early- to mid-1980s to eliminate tax shelters created through
"passive activities", culminating in the enactment in the Tax Reform Act of
1986 of section 469, discussed supra note 43 and accompanying text.).
50. ERNST & YOUNG REAL ESTATE GROUP, THE Low-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT: THE FIRST DECADE 86 (1997). See also MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK
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sidered making it a refundable credit, but concluded that this
was not "politically feasible."5 1 Even as a tradable credit, the
LIHTC was only renewed year by year initially, until it was
eventually made permanent in 1993.52 The creation of the
LIHTC is in part historical happenstance (that a once-in-a-gen-
eration tax reform effort coincided with steep cuts in direct
subsidies for housing and elimination of a popular tax shelter)
and part bipartisan compromise (as the political coalition be-
hind the LIHTC galvanized in the late 1980s, it became a pop-:
ular program).
The market for LIHTCs has changed dramatically since
the credit was originally enacted. In the first and second years
that the LIHTC existed, the market was dominated by individ-
ual investors, with 85.7% and 98.3% of equity for LIHTC
projects provided by individuals respectively in 1987 and
1988.53 In these early years, syndicators aggregated invest-
ments from individuals and allocated those investments across
partnerships with equity stakes in LIHTC projects; in ex-
change for this equity, the LIHTCs and other tax benefits
flowed through to the individual investors. 54 In the early
1990s, the market shifted from domination by individual inves-
tors to institutional investors.55 By 2006 individuals provided
just .03% of the equity for LIHTC projects, and in 2007, indi-
viduals accounted for 0% of equity investments. 56 A further
FORCE supra note 41. In 1988, the senators appointed a task force to assess
the LIHTC, which was scheduled to expire at the end of 1989. Id. at 1-2. The
task force recommended making the LIHTC permanent along with a num-
ber of technical adjustments to the operation of the LIHTC. Id. at 3-7.
51. Kaye, supra note 38, at 885 (the author, Kaye, worked on the staff of
SenatorJohn Danforth while the LIHTC was being conceived of, written and
enacted, and the Senator credits Kaye with "making the LIHTC work", John
Danforth, Faith and Politics (2006)).
52. Christine Serlin, The LIHTC at 25, AFFORDABLE HOUSING FINANCE,
June 2011, available at http://www.housingfinance.com/ahf/articles/2011 /
june/061 1-specialfocus-The-LIHTC-At-25.htm.
53. ERNST &YOUNG, ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PARTNERS, INC., Low-INCOME
HoUsING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENT SURVEY 5 (2009) [hereinafter ERNST &
YOUNG, SURVEY].
54. Id. See also Ballard, supra note 46, at 218 n.32.
55. See ERNST & YOUNG, SURVEY supra note 53 at 5.
56. Id. Part of this transition is explained because initially there were a
number of unappealing requirements for investors, including that transfera-
bility was impeded, and the credit was not permanent so there was a risk that
resources devoted to investing in LIHTC projects would be useless in future
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shift also occurred in more recent years, from a diverse range
of institutional investors to a small number of large investors
from the financial services industry, most notably Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.57 During this time, as the market for
LIHTCs became more sophisticated, credits commanded
higher prices (meaning the amount of equity provided to
LIHTC projects for a given allocation of tax credits increased)
and yields fell for investors, though demand stayed strong.58
2. The New Markets Tax Credit
The NMTC is an incentive to spur investments in low-in-
come communities and investments to benefit low-income
people.59 The NMTC was the result of a bipartisan compro-
mise in Congress between pro-business, anti-tax factions and
pro-community development, anti-poverty factions.6 0 It was
modeled on the by-then very successful LIHTC.6' The Trea-
sury Department, which manages the NMTC, certifies and
then allocates tax credits to Community Development Entities
(CDEs) that meet statutory requirements qualifying them as
well-situated to make effective investments in low-income com-
munities.62 Low-income communities are areas with census
tracts where the poverty rate is in excess of 20% or the median
income is less than or equal to 80% of the statewide or metro-
politan area median income. CDEs that make investments in
years. Id., see generally MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE, supra note 41, at 8
(urging congress to minimize "perceived risks" of nascent LIHTC invest-
ments).
57. Id. at 9.
58. See id. at 5-6. See also Desai et al. supra note 28, at 24 (citing ERNsT &
YOUNG, SURVEY supra note 53). The ability of institutional investors to find
economies of scale as compared to syndicators drove up the price of the tax
credits, eventually making syndication to individuals impractical. ERNST &
YOUNG, SURVEY supra note 53, at 5.
59. Ted M. Handel, The New Markets Tax Credit Program: New Tax Credits
Will Level the Playing Field for Investments in Low-Income Areas, Los Angeles Law-
yer, Jan. 2003, at 13-14. See I.R.C. § 45D (West 2010).
60. RAPOZA AsSOCS. FOR THE NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., THE NEW
MARKETs TAX CREDIT: 10TH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 3 (2010) [HEREINAFTER NEW
MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL.].
61. Id.
62. CDEs must have a primary mission of promoting community develop-
ment, and must be locally accountable as indicated by representation on the
governing board or on an advisory committee. See I.R.C. § 45D(c) (1); Han-
del, supra note 59, at 14.
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such areas can then receive a 39% credit for these investments
over seven years.63 Nearly $30 billion of credits have been pro-
vided for CDE investments since the program was enacted in
2000.64
Tradability is a key aspect of NMTCs. Investors may bene-
fit from NMTCs either by investing directly in CDEs, or by in-
vesting in funds that purchase NMTCs from CDEs. 65 The cred-
its are distributed to investors in the CDEs, who, similar to
LIHTC investors, provide capital for projects and ventures fi-
nanced by the CDEs. These investments are typically made in
real estate projects or in existing or start-up businesses operat-
ing in low-income communities. 66 The credit makes the invest-
ments more profitable and less risky. NMTCs are subject to
recapture for the seven year period after the initial investment
is made if the CDE loses certification, fails to use the invest-
ment, redeems the investment (for example, sells qualifying
stock), or if the IRS finds that the purpose of the transaction is
inconsistent with the NMTC program, so investors have a
strong interest in ensuring the CDE complies with IRS require-
ments.67
The NMTC requires a shorter compliance period, the
time during which the qualifying conditions must be main-
tained or otherwise a recapture provision is triggered, than the
LIHTC (seven years for NMTC versus 15 for LIHTC). Further,
there is less risk of failure to qualify for tax credits, because
receiving the credits does not depend on, for example, people
actually moving into the housing units as is the case with the
LIHTC.68 In addition, the NMTC allows allocation of credits to
funds that invested money borrowed against (limited) investor
contributions and expected future revenue streams from the
63. Handel, supra note 59. The NMTC allows a 5% credit in years one
through three, and a 6% credit in years four through seven. I.R.C.
§§ 45D(a) (2)-(3).
64. NEW MARKETS TAx CREDIT PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY COMMU-
Nrry DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, available at http://www.cdfifund.gov/what-we
do/programs-id.asp?programid=5. See also NEW MKTS. TAx CREDIT COAL.,
supra note 60, at 6.
65. Handel, supra note 59, at 18.
66. NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT COAL., supra note 60, at 5.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.45D-1(e) (2005); Handel, supra note 59, at 19.
68. Handel, supra note 59, at 21.
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tax credits, which helps further increase potential yields for
investors.69
The NMTC was developed by the Democratic Clinton ad-
ministration working with Republican Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives Dennis Hastert.70 It was ultimately
enacted in 2000, and subsequently was launched and extended
by the Republican George W. Bush administration.71 The bi-
partisan support the program has garnered is believed to be
due in part to the tax credit structure, which avoids federal
grants and instead relies on "private sector investment."72
3. Safe Harbor Leasing
In 1981, Congress enacted various tax incentives intended
to spur capital investment" and added provisions to make
these tax benefits transferable between corporations.7 4 Trans-
ferability was seen as an alternative to refundability.75 It was
69. Id. at 20 ("Leveraging can also make NMTCs more attractive to inves-
tors. In a simple, straightforward NMTC transaction, an investor only re-
ceives tax credits based on the amount of cash that it pays for its investment
in a CDE. By contrast, as an example of a leveraged transaction, an invest-
ment partnership could be formed in which the investor puts its money into
the partnership and a bank makes a loan to the partnership and not the
CDE. The investment partnership would invest the total proceeds received
from the investor and the bank into a CDE. The investor would then receive
NMTCs based on the total amount of the partnership's investment and not
just its own funds. In this case, the rate of return to an investor could rise
dramatically."). See also Rev. Rul. 2003-20, 2003-1 C.B. 465; Novogradac, supra
note 29, at 450-51.
70. NEW MKTs. TAX CREDIT COAL., supra note 60, at 3.
71. Id. at 3-4.
72. Id. at 3.
73. The tax incentives included the Investment Tax Credit, which al-
lowed for a credit equal to a percentage of the cost of depreciable personal
property purchased or constructed in the tax year, creating an incentive to
businesses to invest. See generally Graetz & Schenk, supra note 21, at 346.
Another of the tax incentives was a new system of accelerated depreciation
deductions, which allowed for depreciation deductions over a period of time
significantly shorter than the range of "useful lives" under the system prior
to 1981. Id. at 339-40.
74. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERN-
MENT'S MARCH TowARD BANKRupTcY 17-18 (2007); Alvin C. Warren, Jr. &
Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor
Leasing, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1752 (1982).
75. Warren & Auerbach, supra note 74, at 1772 ("Refundability of the
relevant tax incentives is generally assumed to be the principal alternative to
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thought that transferability would increase the economic stim-
ulus effect of the tax incentives by allowing corporations that
lacked sufficient tax liability, for example startup companies
or companies with losses, to nonetheless benefit from the tax
incentives.76 However, unlike the LIHTC and NMTC de-
scribed above, Congress did not provide for direct transferabil-
ity of the tax incentives. Rather, the provisions created a "safe
harbor" whereby a company that owned depreciable property
could undertake a complex paper transaction to "sell" the tax
attributes of the property to a company that desired them in a
faux sale/leaseback arrangement.77 Before the safe harbor
provisions were enacted, companies entering into such a sale/
leaseback transaction would have to effect an actual transfer of
property under governing state law and would need to show
economic substance of the transaction in order to gain the
federal tax benefits of the transaction.78 The safe harbor leas-
ing provisions dispensed with these requirements, creating a
category of "federal tax ownership" independent from actual
ownership under state law and requiring no actual economic
substance otherwise.79 Thus, certain tax attributes became
freely transferable through sale/leaseback arrangements.80
There was a swift political backlash, with public objections
to the corporations buying and selling millions of dollars of
leasing, but it is also possible to design an explicit program of transferability
that does not involve the fiction of leasing.").
76. Warren & Auerbach note that the legislative history is not determina-
tive as to whether Congress viewed the ITC and ACRS as a subsidy to recipi-
ent corporations or as a structural component of the tax code intended to
reduce rates. Id. at 1757-58. However there is no justification for transfera-
bility of these tax benefits (which creates, for some taxpayers, negative tax
rates) unless the provisions are seen as subsidies. Id.
77. SHAVIRO, supra note 74, at 18.
78. Warren & Auerbach, supra note 74, at 1762-63.
79. Id.
80. The mechanics of even the most basic safe harbor leasing transaction
are somewhat confusing, but are described well by Warren & Auerbach:
"[T]he lessor's cash payment to the lessee for tax benefits is characterized as
a down payment on the purchase price. The remainder of the purchase
prices is financed by a 'loan' from the lessee to the lessor. The lessor repays
this loan over the term of the lease with principal and interest payments that
equal the rental payments from the lessee to the lessor; thus, the down pay-
ment is the only cash to change hands. . . A lessor will be willing to make a
down payment equal to the present value of tax reductions resulting from
ACRS deductions and the ITC." Id. at 1763-64.
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deductions and credits.1 Congress enacted these provisions
knowing how they would be used, and the Reagan administra-
tion initially defended them indicating that the alternative was
tax motivated (but inefficient) mergers and acquisitions.82
The legislative history indicates that the leasing mechanism
was adopted out of a desire to ensure an ongoing relationship
between the parties, which would simplify recapture of tax
benefits if necessary. 3 Policymakers' avoidance of an explicit
transferability regime, however, helped ratchet up pressure on
Congress by creating the appearance of abuse.84 Congress
promptly repealed the provisions in 1982, just a year after they
were first enacted.85
4. Other Tradable Tax Credits
Tradable tax credits have been proposed, and in some
cases enacted, in a wide variety of contexts. Some proposals
have been made recently to add tradability to existing tax ben-
efits such as cost recovery deductions86 and the energy tax
credit. 7 Other proposals have been to create entirely new
tradable tax benefits, such as President Bush's proposal for a
81. SHAVIRO, supra note 74, at 18.
82. Id.; Henry V. Barry, Note, Safe Harbor Leases: The Costs of Tax Benefit
Transfers, 34 STAN. L. R. 1309, 1311 n.12 (1982) (describing a speech by a
Reagan administration official expressing concern about mergers and acqui-
sitions motivated by a desire to acquire tax credits).
83. Joint Comm. on Taxation, Safe Harbor Leasing Provisions Under
ACRS, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 205, Oct 23, 1981, at J-8. Recapture might
be necessary if a taxpayer holding depreciable property took depreciation
deductions against ordinary income, but then sold the depreciable property
for a gain. Although absent the depreciation deductions the gain would be
capital, section 1245 has rules allowing for recapture of the depreciated por-
tion of the gain as ordinary income. If the depreciation deductions were
freely transferable with no ongoing relationship between the entity holding
the property and the entity taking depreciation deductions, such recapture
might be administratively difficult to achieve.
84. SHAVIRo, supra note 74, at 18.
85. Id.
86. Ronald W. Blasi, A Proposal for an Elective Tax Benefits Transfer System,
10 FL. TAx R. 267, 294 (2010) (seeking to establish neutrality as between
owners and lessees of business property).
87. The Role of Tax Incentives in Addressing Rural Energ Needs and Conserva-
tion: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 10 (2001) (statement of
Terry Holzer, General Manager, Yellowstone Valley Electric Co-op); Mark
Shahinian, The Tax Man Cometh Not: How the Non-Transferability of Tax Credits
Harms Indian Tribes, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 267 (2007).
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tax credit for health care for individuals that could be trans-
ferred to an insurer 8 and for a homeowner's tax credit to in-
centivize construction of affordable non-rental housing.89 At
the state level, there are numerous existing and proposed trad-
able tax credits.90 Nonetheless, scant analytical attention has
been focused on tradable tax credits to date.
III.
THE CASE FOR TRADABLE TAX CREDITS
A. Tradable Tax Credits Are Economically Equivalent
to Refundable Tax Credits
This section argues that tradable tax credits offer advan-
tages as compared to other policy mechanisms, and that
policymakers should consider the tradable tax credit form as a
potentially desirable form of tax incentive, rather than only as
a necessity of political compromise as was the case with the
LIHTC and NMTC. The benefits of the tradable tax credit are
most apparent when compared to the refundable tax credit.
The efficiency of tradable tax credits matches, and in some
instances may surpass, that of refundable tax credits. Further,
tradable tax credits offer political advantages that are not pos-
sible with refundable tax credits, while matching refundable
tax credits on equity grounds.
The key starting point for this argument, a point which
has largely been disregarded by academics and policymakers,
is that tradable tax credits can be the economic equivalent of
both direct subsidies and refundable tax credits.9 1 With direct
88. Leonard Burman & Jonathan Gruber, Tax Credits for Health Insurance,
TAx POLICY ISSUES AND OIrloNs (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center), no.
11,June 2005, at 2 n.2, available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/311
189_IssuesOptions_ 1.pdf (describing the Bush administration proposal for
limited transferability and noting, without further explanation, that "[i]n
practice, such a mechanism is likely to be very difficult to implement effec-
tively.").
89. Desai et al., supra note 28, at 1-2.
90. See, e.g., A Guide to Pennsylvania State Transferable Tax Credits, supra
note 29, at 8-9 (describing four tradable state tax credits available in Penn-
sylvania); Rothstein & Wineinger, supra note 29, at 53 (describing six trad-
able tax credits available in Missouri, and other tax credits that may be made
tradable).
91. Batchelder acknowledges in a footnote that "tradable tax credits and
tradable deductions can be economically equivalent to refundable tax cred-
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spending the government attempts to achieve a social or eco-
nomic objective through expenditures enacted and imple-
mented outside the I.R.C.9 2 In a refundable tax credit regime,
a taxpayer who files a tax return receives a set credit amount in
exchange for meeting a condition defined in the tax code.93 If
the taxpayer has no tax liability, the government provides a
refund to the taxpayer; if the taxpayer does have tax liability,
the credit amount offsets that liability dollar for dollar.
In a tradable tax credit regime, the taxpayer may offset
tax liability dollar for dollar and may sell any credit amount
that exceeds his tax liability to a third party. The third party
can then use the credit amount to offset her own liability.
Therefore, the benefit to the taxpayer in a tradable tax credit
regime can be the same as in a refundable regime - the full
nominal value of the credit - but the source of any cash pay-
ments is different. The two are economically equivalent, as is
described in greater detail below.
The possible variations in structure of a government in-
centive and the economic equivalence of tradable tax credits
and refundable tax credits are made apparent through an ex-
ample. Consider the following scenario. Congress determines
that energy efficiency should take on increased importance to
building owners because it can create significant benefits for
society in the form of reduced energy costs and reduced pollu-
tion from energy production. Following hearings on the sub-
its, but they have generally been avoided by Congress since the repeal of safe
harbor leasing". Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 34 n. 36 (citing Shaviro,
supra note 74, at 18). But very limited attention has been given to this point
otherwise. Shaviro describes safe harbor leasing as a violation of "the folk
definition of taxes as payments to the government rather than from the gov-
ernment." Shaviro, supra note 74, at 18. Shaviro concludes the "[p]rovisions
that are labeled 'tax benefits' are not supposed to be tradable, any more
than they are supposed to be directly refundable by the government beyond
the amount of taxes otherwise due from the same taxpayer at the same time
under the same set of tax rules." Id.
92. For example, if the government wanted more low-income housing, it
would appropriate money to build such housing. Or if the government
wanted greater investment in an emerging technology, for example solar
panels, the government would appropriate funds to research and develop-
ment of solar panels.
93. Thus, in contrast with direct spending, the social or economic policy
objective is achieved by taxpayer spending that is subsidized by the govern-
ment through the I.R.C.
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ject, Congress determines that the best way to go about achiev-
ing uniform energy efficiency improvements is to encourage
building owners to adhere to an existing environmental stan-
dard. Congress learns that "Leadership in Energy and Environ-
mental Design" (LEED) certification is a widely recognized
green building certification program.94 Green retrofitting of
some buildings to meet LEED Certification standards will
make the buildings more energy efficient and environmentally
friendly, providing a net benefit to society in reduced energy
costs and reduced harmful emissions from power plants. Con-
gress further determines, however, that the investment re-
quired to reap these benefits costs almost twice as much as any
building owner can gain in future savings on energy bills.95
Thus a building owner will recoup savings in lower energy
costs such that it is worthwhile for the building owner to spend
only 50% of the cost of the retrofitting work. This is a market
inefficiency: although a positive externality exists to the re-
trofitting work, it has not been capitalized in the price build-
ing owners have to pay to retrofit a building. The marginal
value of the retrofitting work is higher than the price of that
work, so there is no incentive for any individual building
owner to act, even though society as a whole would be better
off if he did.
To remedy the inefficiency, the government may inter-
vene.9 6 This analysis will consider three ways that the govern-
94. See generally UNITED STATEs GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL (USGBC),
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CategorylD=19 (last visited Oct.
20, 2011) (providing information regarding LEED certification tools and
programs).
95. The cost multiplier assumed here-that retrofitting costs twice as
much as the savings to a building owner over time-is hypothetical.
96. Although the interventions described here are hypothetical-and for
purposes of this paper it is assumed that no other government incentives are
applicable to the scenario described-various government units have in fact
incentivized LEED certification or similar building standards. For example,
New York State had a Green Building Tax Credit, a semi-transferable credit
for buildings that meet certain environmental requirements. See Public Policy
Search, U.S. Green Building Council, http://www.usgbc.org/PublicPolicy/
SearchPublicPolicies.aspx?PagelD=1776 (accessed by searching for "tax
credits" under "Incentive") (last visited Oct. 21, 2011). The credit can be
claimed by building owners and unclaimed portions may be carried forward
to future owners or tenants. Id. Other government units have enacted vari-
ous incentives for LEED certification as well, primarily in the form of requir-
ing that the governments themselves build or use LEED certified buildings.
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ment might conduct such intervention: it could provide direct
subsidies, refundable tax credits, or tradable tax credits. Each
of these policy options is examined by considering the follow-
ing three entities in a simplified economy: (1) a building
owner; (2) the federal government; and (3) a construction
company. Assume that the building owner has no tax liability97
(xtb = 0, subscript b indicating the building owner), the con-
struction company has significant tax liability (xec > 0, subscript
c indicating the construction company) and the government
collects tax revenue of the sum of all tax liability, which in this
simplified economy means the taxes paid by the construction
company (Ix, > 0).
5. Direct Subsidy Example
First, consider how the government might incentivize
LEED certification using a direct subsidy. The building owner
- that is, the party that the government wants to incentivize to
undertake a retrofitting project - will require a subsidy of 50%
of the required investment because the retrofitting costs twice
as much as the direct benefit the building owner will receive. If
the government provides 50% of the investment cost (I), then
the building owner will willingly invest the other 50%. The re-
sult is that the building owner will have invested half of the
cost of green retrofitting, and the government will invest the
other half. The government's net revenue under this regime
will be the sum of all tax revenues (1 = xt) less the 50% sub-
sidy. The construction company is not involved in the direct
Public Policies Adopting or Referencing LEED, U.S. Green Building Council,
http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1852 (last visited Oct.
21, 2011).
97. The tradable mechanism is most obviously useful where one party
lacks sufficient tax liability to take advantage of the tax credit directly. The
building owner in this example might, alternatively, (a) have ample tax lia-
bility in which case the tax credit need not be refundable or tradable in
order for the building owner to take full advantage of it; or (b) have tax
liability that only allows partial use of a credit that is neither refundable nor
tradable. The assumption of zero tax liability avoids discussion of these con-
tingencies, though the analysis in this section applies nonetheless to the lat-
ter scenario. Also note that in the LIHTC context, some developers are tax-
exempt entities, meaning that a tax credit has no value. The tradable struc-
ture of LIHTCs nonetheless creates an incentive for tax-exempt developers
to build low-income housing because those developers can effectively sell the
tax credits.
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subsidy regime, except that the construction company pro-
vides tax revenue to the government. The direct subsidy scena-
rio is represented in Table 1.
TABLE 1: DIRECT SUBSIDY
Construction
A.A. 1.1.1 Building Owner Government Company
Investment <(.5)1> <(.5)1> -
Accounts Receivable - Ex, -
Accounts Payable to Gov't x,= 0 -<xc>
Accounts Payable to Other - - -
Total <(.5)1> 1 x, - (.5)I1 <xe>
KEY: r = rate of tax credit = .51 = investment in project
x = tax liabilityxtc = construction company tax liabilityXb = building owner tax
liability
< > indicates negative values
The assumption that the building owner has zero tax lia-
bility9 8 has no effect on the take-up rate of the government
incentive: the building owner will make the decision whether
or not to pursue the government subsidy irrespective of tax
liability.99
6. Refundable Tax Credit Example
In a refundable credit regime, the outcome is the same as
with a direct subsidy but the means of achieving it are differ-
ent. The government provides a tax credit at a rate (r) suffi-
cient to induce the building owner to make the entire invest-
ment (I). The rate in this case is 50%, equal to the amount of
the direct subsidy described above. The building owner makes
an investment and receives from the government a tax refund
in the amount of 50% of that investment, leaving a net expen-
diture by the building owner of 50% of the total investment
cost. The government has outlays of 50% of the investment
cost, so maintains the same net revenue equal to the sum of all
tax liabilities less the credit rate (.5) times the investment (Tx, -
.5(I)). Again, as in the direct expenditure example, the con-
98. See discussion supra note 97.
99. Note again that taxpayers must have tax liability in order to take ad-
vantage of nonrefundable tax credits, deductions and exemptions.
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struction company plays no role in the tax incentive. The re-
fundable tax credit scenario is represented in Table 2.
TABLE 2: REFUNDABLE TAX CREDIT
Construction
Building Owner Government Company
Initial Investment <I> - -
Accounts Receivable rl Ex, -
Accounts Payable - Gov't Xtb 0 - <x,>
Accounts Payable - Party - <rl>
Total (r-1)I = <(.5)1> Ex, - rI = Ex, - (.5)1 <x,>
KEY: r = rate of tax credit = .51 = investment in project
x, = tax liabilityxe = construction company tax liabilityxs = building owner tax liability
< > indicates negative values
Because that rate is 50% (r = .5), the only differences between
the direct expenditure represented in Table 1 and the refund-
able credit represented in Table 2 is what the payment is
called and how the government administers the program: a
refundable credit is administered within the tax system,
whereas a direct subsidy is administered by some other depart-
ment or agency. 00 There is no economic difference for either
the government or the building owner.
7. Tradable Tax Credit Example
In contrast to the direct subsidy and refundable credit,
the tradable credit mechanism does not utilize any direct pay-
ments from the government to the parties the government
wishes to incentivize. Instead of receiving a direct payment,
the building owner with no tax liability in a tradable credit
regime can sell the right to the tax benefit to a third party (in
this scenario, the construction company) that does have tax
liability. The government then collects taxes from the con-
struction company that are the sum of its regular tax liability
100. There is a potential difference in the timing of the transfer of money
from the government to the building owner. This analysis assumes that there
is no surplus to be gained based on the time value of money: if the subsidy is
provided up front, then the government borrows money against future tax
revenues; if the subsidy is provided after the building owner makes the in-
vestment, then the building owner borrows money against the future receipt
of tax incentives.
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reduced by product of the investment made by the building
owner and the credit rate. The building owner will receive di-
rectly from the construction company an amount equal to the
credit rate multiplied by the building owner's investment (rI).
Thus, the building owner receives the same incentive to make
the investment as in the direct subsidy or refundable credit
regime, the government has the same net revenue, and the
construction company makes a payment to the building owner
in exchange for reduced tax liability. The tradable tax credit
scenario is represented in Table 3.
TABu 3: TRADABLE TAx CREDIT
Construction
Building Owner Government Company
Initial Investment <I>
Accounts Receivable rl Ex, - rl -
Accounts Payable - Gov't Xx_,, = 0 -<x, - rl
Accounts Payable - Party - - <rl>
Total (r-1)I =<(.5)I> x, - rl = x, - (.5)I <xc>
KEY: r = rate of tax credit = .5 I = investment in project
x,= tax liabilityx, = construction company tax liabilityxb = building owner tax liability
< > indicates negative values
The result is that, transaction costs aside, the tradable tax
credit is the economic equivalent of a refundable tax credit or
a direct subsidy. With each of the three, the building owner
pays half of the investment costs, the government has revenues
of total taxes collected minus half of the investment costs, and
the construction company pays, either to the government or to
the building owner, an amount equaling its total tax liability.
The remainder of this section will show that in a limited but
significant set of circumstances the tradable tax credit can of-
fer efficiency, political and equity benefits as compared to re-
fundable tax credits or direct subsidies. Tradable tax credits
are assessed here in terms of efficiency, political considera-
tions and fairness.
B. Efficiency Advantages of Tradable Tax Credits
Perhaps the most frequently referenced criterion for as-
sessing tax policy is the efficiency of provisions of the tax code.
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This section will consider two distinct strands of efficiency.101
First is an analysis of the effect of a tax provision on the overall
allocation of societal resources, which is referred to here as
"universal efficiency." 1 0 2 Second is the extent to which transac-
tion costs are minimized so that government resources achieve
the intended end, which is referred to as "technical effi-
ciency."103 Universal efficiency and technical efficiency each
have numerous facets, discussed below. This section argues
that tradable tax credits can surpass the universal efficiency
benefits of refundable credits, and that tradable tax credits can
match refundable tax credits in technical efficiency. The con-
clusion is that in certain circumstances, described below, trad-
able tax credits are the most efficient form of tax credit.
1. Analysis of the Universal Efficiency of Tradable Tax Credits
The concept of universal efficiency is grounded in the
view that allocation of resources in society is optimized by com-
petitive markets operating without government intervention,
and allows that where there are market failures, government
intervention may increase universal efficiency.10 4 Where dead-
101. The typology that follows is adapted from Zelinsky, supra note 16 at
980-81. Zelinsky distinguishes three types of efficiency to consider in analyz-
ing tax expenditures as compared to direct expenditures or compared to no
government interference: "universal market efficiency," "technical effi-
ciency," and "sectoral efficiency." The first two are discussed in detail here,
though this discussion has somewhat broadened Zelinsky's understanding of
the implications of universal market efficiency (and calls it, simply, universal
efficiency); Zelinsky's sectoral efficiency is not dealt with here, and is inappli-
cable to this discussion. As Zelinsky notes, "the sectoral case against tax in-
centives is not an argument for direct expenditure programs, but rather em-
bodies substantive rejection of government intervention in the domestic
economy." Id. at 987. As discussed at the outset, an underlying assumption in
this analysis is that intervention takes place because positive externalities
have been identified; the question is how government can structure an in-
centive to best address the positive externality.
102. Id. at 980-81 (describing "universal market efficiency" as a term used
by tax policy commentators who support of proposition that perfectly com-
petitive markets lead to an optimal allocation of society's resources).
103. Id. at 992-95.
104. See id. at 980-81. Note that Zelinsky discusses market efficiency as a
threshold consideration: government intervention in the economy either in-
creases or decreases deadweight loss, and accordingly may or may not be
appropriate. He then proceeds to analyze the technical efficiency of tax in-
centives as compared to direct expenditures. See alsoJONATHAN GRUBER, PuB-
LIc FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 589 (3rd ed. 2011) (describing that "social
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weight loss is minimized, universal efficiency is maximized.105
For these purposes, universal efficiency encompasses the con-
cept of Pareto efficiency: where an alternative distribution of
societal resources increases welfare without making anyone in
society worse off, there is said to be a Pareto improvement.106
Universal efficiency is not measured as a standalone, but
rather is used here as a metric to make relative comparisons
between policy options.
Although universal efficiency is used normatively to cri-
tique tax expenditures because tax expenditures distort mar-
kets,' 0 7 this paper assumes that policymakers can identify mar-
ket failures and market inefficiencies, and further assumes
that policymakers can identify activities that create positive ex-
ternalities but that will not occur without government inter-
vention.108 Such government interventions create Pareto im-
provements, increasing overall social welfare.109 However, de-
termining what interventions give rise to universal efficiency
gains is only half the challenge: once it is determined that in-
tervention is appropriate, there still may be second order ef-
fects on universal efficiency. Even as an intervention addresses
one market failure, it may create distortions and deadweight
loss that decrease universal efficiency. Different types of inter-
vention may cause different amounts of collateral distortions.
Some interventions may have additional ancillary externalities
that increase or decrease social welfare and affect whether an
efficiency is maximized at competitive equilibrium without government in-
tervention").
105. See supra note 20 (defining deadweight loss).
106. Pareto efficiency exists when resources are allocated such that no
person can be made better off without someone being made worse off. See
generally SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 2, at 185. See also supra note 30.
107. Note, though, that Zelinsky disputes this point, arguing that where
there are positive externalities tax incentives may be efficient. See Zelinsky,
supra note 16, at 977.
108. See supra Part II.A. Cf Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 26 (limiting
their focus, in the same manner as here, to tax incentives that are "intended
to encourage behavior generating positive externalities").
109. Note that the Pareto improvement described here is within a market
where there is a positive externality being realized due to government inter-
vention. However, the tax that is funding the intervention may mean that
the net effect of the intervention is not a Pareto improvement because the
tax may make some part of society worse off than the intervention makes
another part better off. Broader consideration of Pareto efficiency implica-
tions of government intervention is beyond the scope of this analysis.
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allocation of resources is Pareto efficient. The tradable tax
credit, by way of its structure, can create two types of positive
externalities that increase universal efficiency: (a) conferring a
benefit on third parties involved in tradable tax credit transac-
tions, 110 which is a Pareto improvement derived from the trad-
able tax credit structure; and (b) smoothing"' of income
shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations.112
a. Benefit (B,) of Tradable Tax Credits to Third Parties
In some instances, there may be additional benefits associ-
ated with tradable tax credits that are not available with re-
fundable tax credits or direct subsidies. In the LEED certifica-
tion example, the construction company will only participate if
it can benefit from the exchange in some way. There are two
related ways for the construction company to benefit: first, it
may derive some additional advantage from participation in
the transaction. For example, facilitating a LEED certification
project may provide a benefit to the construction company in
that the construction company can make use of environmental
credentials. This benefit, perhaps by receipt of goodwill or by
facilitation of a successful marketing campaign, is the positive
externality (Be) of the transfer of the tradable tax credit. At the
same time, there is no cost to the building owner (Bb = 0) of
conferring this benefit on the construction company.113 As
such, the benefit constitutes a welfare gain to society that is
created by the tradable structure of the tax credit. The pros-
pect of this benefit means that the construction company may
be willing to pay a premium on the credit amount in order to
receive the benefit." 4
110. See infra Part III.B.1.i (describing 8 ).
111. Batchelder states: "all else equal, the value of a tax incentive generally
should not vary by the size of one's lifetime earnings, whether one earns
more earlier or later in the life cycle, or whether one's earnings are more
smooth or more volatile over time." Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 55.
Smoothing refers to policies that effectively counteract abrupt economic
changes.
112. See infra Part III.B.1.ii.
113. This is an example of a benefit conferred on the taxpaying entity
(the construction company) but not at the expense of the acting entity (the
building owner).
114. Desai also notes that prices of LIHTCs may exceed the actuarial fair
values, "reflect[ing] the fact investors may derive additional benefits from
the credits since low-income housing projects can be used to meet [Commu-
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The second possible incentive for the construction com-
pany to participate in the tradable tax credit transaction is the
payment premium related to B. The construction company
will pay the building owner some amount of money that is less
than the actuarial fair value of the tax credit plus the benefits
to the construction company associated with the tax credit.115
The difference between the amount the construction com-
pany pays and the amount of the credit against tax liability is
profit to the construction company. There may be a premium
or penalty (expressed as D, which may be negative or positive)
included in the amount that the construction company pays
for the tax credit, meaning that the construction company may
either pay more or less than the actuarial fair value of the tax
credit.116 The additional benefit and possible penalty associ-
ated with the tradable tax credit structure are represented in
Table 4.
nity Reinvestment Act] requirements." Desai et al., supra note 28, at 25. The
Community Reinvestment Act requires banks to make statutorily specified
investments in communities where they accept deposits but that have been
under-served by the financial industry historically. ERNST & YOUNG, SURVEY
supra note 53, at 5 n.3.
115. See Desai et al., supra note 28, at 15-16, which discusses the market
treatment of LITHCs, observing "if the market prices the credits fairly and
the buyers have sufficient tax liability" then the price of the credits will equal
the credit amount. However, "there may be deviations of the price of the
credits from their actuarial fair value." Id. at 24. This is due to a number of
factors, including the discounting of the nominal value of credits received
because the benefit will be received over time, additional compensation re-
quired by taxpaying entities to incorporate the risk of default or project fail-
ure, and supply and demand shocks related to broader economic factors.
116. Basic economic principles instruct that a market price will be set
based on supply and demand so that the building owner and the construc-
tion company will both benefit from the exchange of the credit. The market
price for LIHTCs reached as high as $0.95 per $1 of tax credits. ERNST &
YOUNG, SURVEY, supra note 53, at 10. In contrast, the market for NMTCs
peaked at $0.75 to $0.80 per dollar, and when demand was low (as was the
case during the economic downturn in 2008-2009), the price fell below
$0.50 per dollar. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-334, NEw MAR-
KETS TAX CREDIT: THE CREDIT HELPS FUND A VARIETY OF PROJECTS IN Low-
INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT COULD BE SIMPLIFIED 29 (2010) [hereinafter
GAO, NMTC].
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TABLE 4: ADDED BENEFIT AND POSSIBLE PENALTY
OF TRADABLE TAX CREDITS
Construction
Building Owner Government Company
Initial Investment <I> - -
Accounts Receivable rl +/- a Ex, - rI -
Accounts Payable - Gov't EXtb= 0 - <xe> - rl
Accounts Payable - Party - - <rl +/- a>
Total (r-1)I +/- a Ex, - rI <xt,> +/- a + B,
KEY: r = rate of tax creditI = investment in project
x, tax liabilityx,, = construction company tax liabilityXth = building owner tax liability
a = premium or penalty building owner receives based on value of tax credit to
construction company
Be = benefit to the construction company for association with project
< > indicates negative values
If Bc makes the tax credit worth more to the construction com-
pany than its actuarial fair value, then @ is a premium. In that
instance, the construction company pays more, meaning that
for the building owner the amount received with a tradable
credit (rl + D), is greater than the amount received with a re-
fundable credit (rI). On the other hand if Be is insignificant or
nonexistent, then D is a penalty that accounts for any costs that
must be paid to make it worth the construction company's
while to participate in the transaction. In that instance, the
construction company pays less, meaning that for the building
owner the amount received with a tradable credit (rI - a) is less
than the amount received with a refundable credit (rI).
Whether or not there is a premium or penalty in the price the
construction company pays depends on whether or not the
construction company gains other benefits (8c) from the trans-
action.
Now consider a refundable credit and a tradable credit
head-to-head (represented in Table 5). Assume that the invest-
ment required for retrofitting is $100, and that the tax credit is
worth 50% of the investment, or $50. Assume also that the gov-
ernment has total tax collections (absent any credits) of
$1,000, and that the construction company has tax liability
(again, disregarding any tax credit) of $100. With a refund-
able credit, the government will make a payment of $50 to the
building owner. The building owner will thus spend $100, re-
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ceive a credit of $50 from the government, and the govern-
ment will have net revenues of $950.
With a tradable credit, the building owner will spend $100
and will receive $50 from the construction company. The con-
struction company will have its $100 of tax liability reduced by
$50, and will receive the additional benefit of goodwill from
publicity for sponsoring the green retrofitting project (Be).
This example assumes no penalty or premium on the credits
(D = 0): the benefit the construction company receives is
enough to induce the transfer of the tax credit at the nominal
value of the credit, but not enough to warrant payment of any
more than the nominal amount. The government will receive
tax revenues of $950. In short, tradable tax credits and refund-
able tax credits leave the parties in the same economic posi-
tion, but the construction company receives an additional ben-
efit in the tradable credit system. The comparison between re-
fundable tax credits and tradable tax credits for the LEED
certification scenario is represented in Table 5.
TABLE 5: REFUNDABLE CREDIT (RC) vs.
TRADABLE CREDIT (TC)
Building Owner Government Construction Company
Type of Credit RC TC RC TC RC TC
Initial Investment <$100> <$100> -
Accts Receivable .5 * $100 .5 * 100 $1000 $1000- $50 - -
Accts Payable - Gov't 0 0 <$50> - <$100> $100 - $50
Accts Payable - Party - - - - $50 - 8,
Total <$50> <$50> $950 $950 <$100> <$100> + B,
KEY: B, = benefit of goodwill and/or marketing opportunities to the construction company
for association with project
In the LEED certification example, B, is a positive exter-
nality created by the existence of the tax incentive, but is not
realized by the construction company absent the tradable tax
credit mechanism. This positive externality, above and beyond
the positive externality that prompts policymakers to imple-
ment the tax incentive, is created solely because of the trad-
able mechanism by which the incentive is delivered. If the gov-
ernment provides the incentive directly, as is the case with a
refundable tax credit, no such benefit is created. Thus trad-
able tax credits applied in certain circumstances offer the pros-
pect of additional welfare gains and B, is a Pareto improve-
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ment created by the tradable tax credit. This welfare gain dis-
tinguishes tradable tax credits from refundable tax credits or
direct subsidies. The tradable tax credit, by creating a benefit
to the construction company at no cost to society, provides an
efficiency advantage as compared to the refundable credit or
the direct subsidy.
b. Smoothing Income Shocks and Macroeconomic
Fluctuations
Tradable tax credits, like refundable tax credits, can pro-
vide smoothing effects across income shocks and
macroeconomic fluctuations.'17 Income shocks are abrupt
changes in income. For example, many firms suffered severe
reductions in income during the 2008 recession. However, if
such firms were profitable and earned income before and af-
ter the recession, the reduced income was an aberration - a
"shock" rather than a permanent adjustment. Tradable tax
credits can counteract such shocks because they are not neces-
sarily impacted when income and tax liability is significant in
one year, but negligible the next year. For example, in the
LEED certification scenario the construction company that
purchases tradable tax credits has little risk of loss due to in-
come shocks because if it suffered such shocks it could sell its
tradable tax credits to another entity that has enough tax lia-
bility to take full advantage of the credits. Further, the possibil-
ity of selling tradable tax credits offers a reliable source of rev-
enue to counteract income shocks directly. Tradability there-
fore would reduce the severity of an income shock for the
construction company." 8
117. Cf Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 57-65 (discussing the smooth-
ing effects of refundable tax credits on household income shocks and
macroeconomic fluctuations; the analysis applies similarly to firm income
shocks).
118. As is discussed infra notes 122 and 124, there may be problems with
depending on a market-based mechanism to counteract market forces. This
is most obviously true with regard to counteracting macroeconomic fluctua-
tions, described below, but also may apply to income shocks. To the extent
that income shocks afflict firms for isolated reasons, the existence of a thick
market for tradable tax credits should maintain a smoothing effect because
there will be other parties (for example, other construction companies) to
step in and purchase tradable tax credits. However, widespread reduction in
income in a key industry for a given tradable tax credit would be problem-
atic for the smoothing effects described here.
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Similarly, when macroeconomic fluctuations - changes in
the "overall performance of the economy"" 9 - occur, firms
may adjust output functions to anticipate or in response to re-
duced demand. Tradable tax credits may smooth
macroeconomic fluctuations by providing stable incentives
that counteract reduced demand. 120 When macroeconomic
demand fluctuates, companies must adjust their production
functions accordingly, and these adjustments have costs.' 2' Ad-
justment costs constitute deadweight loss, because an actual
adjustment is not warranted, and are a symptom of market fail-
ure. But adjustment costs can be reduced by counteracting the
necessity of adjustment. Tradable tax credits act as a counter-
balance to macroeconomic shocks by maintaining demand for
incentivized behaviors, and by providing liquidity during
downturns. This has the effect of smoothing macroeconomic
demand, which helps firms avoid adjustment costs.
For example, the value of a tradable tax credits for LEED
certification would not change during an economic slowdown,
so the building owner would have the same incentive to under-
take a retrofitting project and the construction company
would have the same incentive to be involved in the transac-
tion. 122 Such avoidance improves universal efficiency as re-
sources that may have been devoted to adjusting to fluctua-
tions may instead be used more productively. If aggregate
macroeconomic demand'23 were depressed by any number of
factors, such as a financial crisis or housing market crash, the
tradable tax credit for green retrofitting could help counteract
119. SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 2, at 5.
120. Cf Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 61 ("Uniform refundable cred-
its can help stabilize macroeconomic demand fluctuations .. . by eliminating
fluctuation penalties in a way that increases the value of the tax incentive in
recessionary periods."). Batchelder also notes that "there is broad consensus
in support of taxing and spending policies that are automatically
countercyclical." Id.
121. See id.
122. This analysis reveals that tradable tax credits may not be as effective
smoothing mechanisms as are refundable tax credits in some circumstances.
When demand flags, tradable tax credits may lose value and thus reduce the
incentive to act. See infra note 124 (discussing problems in the LIHTC mar-
ket in 2008).
123. Aggregate demand is the "total amount that different sectors in the
economy willingly spend in a given period." SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra
note 2, at 416.
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that decreased demand by maintaining demand for retrofit-
ting services. 124
This smoothing effect therefore can counteract income
shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations in ways that
nonrefundable credits, deductions and exemptions, all of
which provide varied incentives directly tied to annual income,
do not. Tradable tax credits can remain effective regardless of
such shocks and fluctuations: taxpayers continue perform so-
cially advantageous activities when the incentive to act remains
constant.125
2. Analysis of the Technical Efficiency of Tradable Tax Credits
Analyzing technical efficiency involves considering "the
cheapest way the government can induce" a behavior that has
positive externalities, or, put another way, the extent to which
the government gets "bang for its buck" for the resources it
devotes to a policy objective.126 In arguing that tax expendi-
tures may be preferable to direct expenditures, Edward Zelin-
sky made the case that "the transaction costs of using the tax
124. One important concern with regard to the suitability of tradable tax
credits to counter macroeconomic fluctuations is that the non-government
entities involved in a tradable tax credit transaction are subject to the same
macroeconomic forces that may need to be counteracted. This concern was
brought to the forefront with the LIHTC in 2008, when the market for
LIHTCs completely froze during the economic crisis. See GAO, NMTC, supra
note 116, at 30. This was a particularly extreme example, because the reces-
sion in 2008 was prompted in large part by issues in housing markets. Fur-
ther, the major investors in LlHTCs at that time included Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, which racked up enormous losses and thus had no use for
LIHTCs and rapidly exited the market. See Nick Timiraos, Treasury Blocks the
Sale of Tax Credits by Fannie, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2009, at BI (describing Fan-
nie Mae's attempts to sell $3 billion of LIHTCs that it could not make use of
due to lack of tax liability; the deal was blocked by the Treasury Department
for reasons related to the federal government's conservatorship of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac). The price of LIHTCs collapsed, and the government
had to step in and, on a temporary basis, replace allocations of LIHTCs with
direct grants to keep projects moving. See GAO, NMTC, supra note 116, at
30. The circumstances in 2008 seem to have constituted a perfect storm of a
severe recession that centered on the industry the tax credit was designed to
operate in, but it may nonetheless be a concern as far as counteracting mod-
est macroeconomic fluctuations as discussed here.
125. Cf Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 55-56 (describing "fluctuation
penalties" that result when tax incentives are not uniform).
126. Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 992; Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 45-
46.
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system to implement government policies may be less. . . than
the cost of implementing direct expenditure programs." 27
This section considers the technical efficiency of tradable tax
credits as compared to direct expenditures and refundable tax
credits,128 including analysis of enforcement costs associated
with different types of incentives.
The primary criticism of tradable tax credits - the one
that echoes throughout Batchelder's work in the insistence
that refundable credits are the only "straightforward" or "sim-
ple" way to create behavioral incentives in the tax code129 - is
that tradable tax credits are necessarily too complex to com-
pete with the technical efficiency of other mechanisms of gov-
ernment intervention. Critics of tradable tax credits have not
expounded on the complexity concern,130 and complexity can
take on various forms, some of which are more applicable to
tradable credits than others. 31 Rule complexity and compli-
ance complexity are not obviously more problematic with trad-
able tax credits than with other types of tax incentives. One
measure of these types of complexity is the length of time the
IRS estimates it will take to understand and complete a tax
form.13 2 The IRS estimates for the LIHTC and NMTC are 8
127. Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 978.
128. A key issue encompassed in technical efficiency is the marginal versus
inframarginal impacts of a tax incentive. Inframarginal impacts are the be-
havior that would have occurred regardless of the incentive provided; margi-
nal impacts are changes in behavior that are actually caused by the govern-
ment incentive. See GRUBER, supra note 104, at 541. Technical efficiency is
increased when inframarginal impact of a provision is minimized and margi-
nal impact is maximized.
129. Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 28-29,
130. See, e.g., Burman & Gruber, supra note 88.
131. David Bradford identified three types of complexity: rule complexity,
or how complicated the law is to understand; compliance complexity, or how
complicated the law is to comply with; and transactional complexity, or the
extent to which the law requires complicated arranging of affairs. See GRAETZ
& SCHENK, supra note 21, at 31 (citing DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE
INCOME TAx 266-67 (1986)),
132. The IRS provides estimates of the time necessary to learn about the
law or form, perform necessary record keeping, and prepare and send the
necessary form to the IRS. See, e.g., I.R.S. Form 8864, available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8864.pdf. This paper does not intend to suggest that
these estimates provide a definitive measure of rule and compliance com-
plexity of various tax provisions, but the author believes that the numbers
are at least indicative of the relative complexity.
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hours 47 minutes and 8 hours 45 minutes respectively.13 3 The
IRS estimates for the Renewable Fuel Credit and the Invest-
ment Credit, both of which are non-tradable tax credits, are 11
hours 53 minutes and 34 hours 5 minutes respectively.13 4
Other non-tradable tax credits require both more and less
time than the existing tradable credits. With the green retrofit-
ting example, it is easy to imagine that the added rule and
compliance complexity of a tradable credit as compared to a
refundable or direct expenditure might not be significant. Re-
gardless of the structure, there will be some rule and compli-
ance complexity and the fact that the benefit of the tax credit
is tradable adds some additional parties to that complexity.
Transactional complexity, however, is more problematic
for the tradable tax credit mechanism. The partnership ar-
rangement required to trade LIHTCs,135 for example, seems
to introduce significant complexity and accompanying costs to
arrange to receive the tax credit. However, although there is
no doubt that the mechanism requires complexity, it is a mis-
take to think that the tax credit mechanism introduces this
complexity. Even if there were a direct subsidy to a developer
to build low-income housing, significant (and complex) legal
entities would be necessary to own and manage the property.
Therefore at least some of the complexity that is perhaps at-
tributed to LIHTCs is in fact a symptom of the complexity req-
uisite in any property ownership and development enterprise.
Additionally, the tradable tax credit mechanism provides
a clear measure of the transaction costs associated with the
credit in the form of the market price for the credits. The mar-
ket price for LIHTCs has reached as high as $0.95 per $1 of
tax credits. 36 Thus the costs imposed on third parties were
133. I.R.S. Form 8586, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8586.
pdf; I.R.S. Form 8874, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8874.
pdf.
134. I.R.S. Form 8864, available at a http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f88
64.pdf; Instructions 3468, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i3468.
pdf. The Investment Credit form includes credits for several disparate activi-
ties.
135. See supra Part II.B.1.
136. ERNST & YOUNG, SURVEY supra note 53, at 10. See also supra note 116
(describing the markets for LIHTCs and NMTCs).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Business
264 [Vol. 8:227
THE CASE FOR TRADABLE TAX CREDITS
less than five percent of the credit amount. 37 This still leaves
the possibility that sellers of LIHTCs are absorbing high trans-
action costs, but as described above it is not clear that those
costs are necessarily substantial additional costs to such a de-
velopment. Although there is no readily available point of
comparison for direct expenditure programs, this indicates
that the costs associated with tradable credits need not be pro-
hibitive.
Enforcement concerns are a key source of rule, compli-
ance and transactional complexity for many tax expenditures.
Some argue that generally policy is better administered
through direct transfers where oversight can be provided by
people with expertise in applicable policy areas, rather than by
the IRS.138 Expertise, it is thought, can help reduce enforce-
ment costs. Consider some alternatives: in the LEED certifica-
tion example, a direct transfer would likely be administered
through the Environmental Protection Agency or the Depart-
ment of Energy, which are presumably staffed by people with
expertise in energy efficiency. Those experts could sculpt ap-
propriate means of enforcing the detailed requirements for
entities to qualify for green retrofitting subsidies, and are well
situated to review projects that claim to qualify. In contrast, the
IRS has little or no expertise in development, let alone the
details of energy efficiency standards and the like that are part
of the green retrofitting requirements.
However, others have noted that if government involve-
ment in programs administered through the I.R.C. continues
as something other than tax expenditures, complexity in the
I.R.C. will simply be replaced by complexity in other govern-
137. If B in the LIHTC context is substantial - for example, $.20 per dollar
of credit - then the transaction costs could be much higher ($.25 per $1 of
credit, but with $1 of credit yielding $1.20 of benefit to society) and still yield
a market price approaching the actuarial value of the tax credit. Nonethe-
less, in such a circumstance the tradable tax credit structure would be pro-
viding a benefit as compared to refundable tax credits or direct subsidies.
138. Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 73 ("consideration should be given
to whether the subsidy is better delivered through the tax system or through
direct transfers or regulation. For instance, the transfer system may have
greater expertise in the area, lower administrative and compliance costs, or
more effective legislative oversight, enforcement, and delivery capabilities.").
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ment programs. 39 Further, for some types of government ini-
tiatives, the IRS may be better situated to administer the pro-
gram than are other government agencies. 140 For example,
the IRS may be a preferable provider of enforcement for the
LIHTC because oversight of that program requires expertise
in distinguishing depreciable versus non-depreciable ex-
penses.141 The IRS' expertise may even be valuable if the pro-
gram were administered as a direct subsidy, if the subsidy were
(similar to the actual LIHTC) based on qualifying expenses.
In contrast, tradable credits allow the IRS to outsource
the expertise and labor necessary for enforcement. Refund-
able credit schemes, like the EITC, are generally wholly admin-
istered by the IRS. This has led to significant enforcement is-
sues where the IRS lacks necessary expertise. 42 In a tradable
tax credit system, the third parties that buy a tradable credit
are incentivized both to undertake ex ante due diligence and
ex post oversight. Ex ante due diligence consists of investigat-
ing the entity seeking to qualify for the tradable tax credit
before the credit is allocated to that entity. This may include
making a risk assessment of the likelihood that the capital the
investor provides will lead to qualifying activity. Ex post over-
sight is the ongoing involvement of the investor once the tax
credit has been allocated (and once the benefits are flowing
through to the investor) to ensure that the qualifying entity
will maintain compliance with IRS requirements for the dura-
tion of the tax credit period. Congress recognized this as a
benefit to the safe harbor leasing scheme, which created an
ongoing relationship between the entity that qualified for a tax
benefit and the entity that realized the benefit.143
139. See Desai et al. supra note 28, at 10-11 (citing David A. Weisbach &
Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L. J. 955
(2004)).
140. The authors note that with the LIHTC, a key element of oversight is
of the nonprofit status of developers, which are part of the IRS' "routine
activities." See Desai et al. supra note 28, at 11.
141. See id.
142. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869-70 (2005) (describing how
EITC has been target of fraud and abuse accusations, and, in response, addi-
tional enforcement procedures have been added to the IRS' administration
of the EITC.).
143. Joint Committee on Taxation, Safe Harbor Leasing Provisions Under
ACRS, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 205, Oct 23, 1981, atJ-8 ("it is argued that
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Existing tradable credits provide a window into possible
enforcement benefits of involving a third party in the incentive
scheme. The LIHTC uses both investors, who provide initial
capital for housing developments, and state housing agencies,
which allocate the tax credits within each state, to provide
oversight and enforce the LIHTC requirements. 144 Local ex-
pertise is particularly useful in the construction and develop-
ment context, where first-hand knowledge of the intricacies of
past projects can be telling of future success rates. If the best
indicators of future success in building and managing a hous-
ing development are past involvement in projects in a concen-
trated geographic area and familiarity with industry and regu-
latory players in that area, an official in Washington, DC is par-
ticularly ill-suited to determine the likelihood of success as
compared to anyone immersed in the local community in
question. In a direct spending program version of the LIHTC
incentive, the review and enforcement function would be car-
ried out by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment; in the tradable scheme, there is no centralized over-
sight. The state agency, which generally has a history of work-
ing with housing developers in the state, allocates the tax
credits based on specific proposals. Further, a proposal is
strengthened in the eyes of the state agency by the support of
reputable investors. These investors undertake their own due
diligence. Combined, this creates significant checks on com-
pliance that would not exist in other structures. 4 5 Further, the
investors' interest in maintaining the flow of tax benefits cre-
ates an internal enforcement mechanism that reinforces the
threat of audit.14 6
lessors will have an economic interest in making certain that investments
are, in fact, made before tax benefits are claimed. The government will not
have to rely merely upon audit by the IRS.").
144. Desai et al. supra note 28, at 18-19 (third parties deemed "delegated
monitors" who ensure compliance because "their entire economic return for
their investment is contingent on compliance.").
145. It is, of course, possible to engage local agencies with an incentive
scheme other than a tradable credit, for example by using block grants to
states to carry out a direct spending program.
146. At the same time, if the government were to eliminate enforcement
entirely, there would be no reliable enforcement mechanism from investors,
who are spurred by fear of penalties from the government. So third party
enforcement must supplement, not replace, government enforcement.
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These enforcement costs must be borne by someone, and
the most efficient option is to assign the burden to whatever
party is best situated to ensure enforcement at low cost. A third
party logically fits that description better than the IRS, and
perhaps even better than a federal or state administrator with
applicable expertise. An investor or local government official
who has easy access to a wide variety of information about a
project (for example, who will be aware whether necessary lo-
cal permits have been procured or who perhaps is already
monitoring progress on the project) can help determine
whether effort should be expended to undertake an audit. In
comparison, a government official will likely rely on informa-
tion submitted by an entity seeking to avoid audit or oversight.
It also bears keeping in mind that when the government does
not provide as much enforcement (but maintains the threat of
recapture of tax benefits), those costs are born by other par-
ties. This is reflected in the market price of tradable tax cred-
its, which thus should be compared to the overhead costs of
direct expenditure programs or programs administered wholly
by the IRS.
In all, tradable tax credits offer potential technical effi-
ciency advantages as well as disadvantages. While enforcement
may be more efficient and effective with a third party involved,
layers of bureaucracy associated with different government
units involved in enforcement may counteract any benefits.
Similarly, while complexity of compliance requirements and
transactional structures necessary to take advantage of trad-
able tax credits may seem daunting, in fact much of this com-
plexity may be inescapable even absent tradable tax credits.
C. Political Advantages of Tradable Tax Credits
Tax policy is freighted with political considerations. The
LIHTC and NMTC, for example, benefited from broad politi-
cal coalitions that perhaps would not have supported direct
spending programs. 1 4 7 Safe harbor leasing was controversial,
and was quickly repealed, despite having the desired policy re-
sult. 48 This section argues that the tradable tax credit offers
significant political advantages that other forms of government
intervention lack in two respects. First, the tradable tax credit
147. See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
148. See supra Part II.B.3.
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mechanism uniquely helps forge broad political coalitions that
ease enactment and may help protect against repeal. Second,
there are procedural advantages to enactment of federal pol-
icy through the tax code rather than as direct spending pro-
grams.
1. Broad Political Constituencies
Perhaps the most notable political advantage of tradable
tax credits is that the mechanism, by including and benefiting
more parties, creates a broad political constituency to advocate
for the creation and maintenance of the provision.14 9 Many
tax incentives or direct subsidies create incentives for parties
to change their behavior; a well-structured tradable tax credit
creates incentives that benefit multiple parties in different
ways. To return to the retrofitting example, the building
owner wants to partake in the behavior because, with a tax in-
centive, it is financially beneficial. At the same time the con-
struction company is motivated by the possibility of creating
goodwill in the community (including the possibility of posi-
tive media coverage and potential advertising benefits) it will
derive from being associated with an environmentally friendly
project. If a proposed government incentive were a direct sub-
sidy or refundable tax credit, the political constituency sup-
porting the provision would be limited to building owners,
and perhaps environmentalists. However, with a tradable
credit, there is a new additional party, construction compa-
nies, who seek a benefit (B c) that will join the political constit-
uency behind the tax incentive.1 5 0
149. Desai describes the general phenomenon of broad political constitu-
encies and the specific constituency that supports the LIHTC, which is made
up of housing advocates, developers and intermediaries. See Desai et al.,
supra note 28, at 19.
150. Additional interested parties may also result in lobbying and rent-
seeking that has negative consequences for society in terms of efficiency and
fairness. In the LEED example, the construction company possibly has an-
other interest: in increasing demand for construction projects generally.
This does not distinguish tradable tax credits from other types of govern-
ment intervention, but the stronger political constituency described here
means that a tradable tax credit may become fertile ground for rent-seeking
because it will be well-protected by a variety of interests. Recall that this pa-
per assumes that government policymakers can identify activities that create
positive externalities but that will not occur without government interven-
tion. See supra Part II.A; supra note 108 and accompanying text. Lobbying
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The political constituencies behind some existing trad-
able tax credits, and the interesting bedfellows seen proposing
tradable tax credits, are informative. For example, the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit was a last minute addition to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, but it quickly gained a strong constit-
uency of housing advocates, developers and investors.151 This
constituency successfully fended off attempts to scale back or
eliminate the LIHTC,15 2 and it has succeeded in enlarging the
LIHTC significantly during a time period when other compa-
rable social programs - and even tax expenditures that are not
tradable - have been limited. Similarly, enactment of the
NMTC was prompted by support of a group called the NMTC
Coalition, which brought together development organizations
with wide-ranging foci (local to national), financial institutions
and others. 53 The NMTC now has widespread support from
community development organizations, public agencies, and
investor groups.' 54 With a refundable tax credit, the constitu-
ency pushing for the credit will necessarily be limited to peo-
ple and groups with narrower interests than is the case with a
tradable tax credit.
and rent-seeking may alter this assumption, or at least alter the ability of
policymakers to follow through on this assumption. To the extent that
strong political coalitions can influence undesirable policy outcomes, the
tradable tax credit mechanism may carry inherent risks that are less acute
with other forms of tax credit.
151. Desai et al., supra note 28, at 19; Interview with F. Barton Harvey III
of The Enterprise Foundation, COMMONWEAL, available at http://www.
commonweal.org/programs/fg_interviews/harvey.html ("And I hate to say
it as crassly as this but you have to have something that has a larger constitu-
ency that other people care about that is part of the power structure of this
country is really doesn't care about fair anything: fair housing or fair any-
thing.").
152. Barton Harvey III, supra note 151 ("It has too many constituents and
it is doing too many good things, the banks like it."). Additionally, in 2003,
supporters of the LIHTC feared that the proposal to exempt dividends from
taxation would depress the market for LIHTCs, and thus opposed it. Barton
said "they did attack it indirectly, the Bush Administration, when Treasury
got hold of this dividend tax idea. They were going to put some strictures on
that would have greatly diluted the low income housing tax credit. And we
went to war [in Congress] and won for other reasons than us. That went
away." Id.
153. Novogradac, supra note 29, at 456.
154. The New Markets Tax Credit Coalition Board of Directors tellingly
includes representatives from each of these groups. See NEW MKTS. TAX
CREDIT COAL., supra note 60, at ii.
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There are some other features of tradable tax credits that
are inherently more appealing in the current political environ-
ment than are the corresponding features of refundable tax
credits and direct spending programs. For one, the market-
based features of tradable credits, whereby value is created
through private transactions, is seen as appealing to certain
political groups. Further, many people object to allowing nega-
tive tax liability on ideological grounds, and tradable tax cred-
its avoid expressly endorsing negative tax liability. Similarly,
tradable tax credits avoid the government making direct pay-
ments, an action that is particularly disdained in some cur-
rently powerful political constituencies.
2. Ease of Enactment as Compared to Direct Spending
A perennial feature in discussions of the advantages of tax
expenditures is the ease of enacting and maintaining tax ex-
penditures as compared to direct spending measures. Trad-
able tax credits, like other tax provisions, provide relative ease
of passage. Tax expenditures are excluded from the regular
budget process, and thus avoid the close scrutiny applied an-
nually to appropriations both by Congress and by the Office of
Management and Budget.155 Further, a spending measure
must survive several hurdles in order to be enacted: appropria-
tions committees in each house of Congress must approve a
spending measure, and then the appropriation must be au-
thorized through separate legislation that originates in one
(or more) of the subject-specific committees in each house.
The spending and authorization measures must then each be
approved by each house. In contrast, a tax expenditure faces
just one hurdle at the committee level in each house: the Ways
and Means Committee in the House and the Finance Commit-
155. See SummEy, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing the early motivations for
creating a tax expenditure budget). Note that the compilation of tax ex-
penditures became a required part of the budget process in 1975 under the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. See Sumvy & McDANIEL, supra note 14, at
1-2. Even with this budget, tax expenditures escape the sort of annual review
required of regular spending measures: tax provisions are, by default, per-
manent measures unless a sunset is specified, whereas spending measures
aside from entitlemcnts must be reenacted each year.
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tee in the Senate.156 Additionally, discretionary spending has
at various times been subject to strict limits.' 5 7 Tax expendi-
tures have not been subject to similar controls.s58 Part of the
explanation for this lies in how tax expenditures are under-
stood politically: many view tax expenditures as tax reduc-
tions.159
The preceding point is often made by critics of tax ex-
penditures, but it is also seen as a positive aspect of tax ex-
penditures. The ease of enactment is a benefit to the propo-
nents of policies carried out via the tax code. Additionally, the
generalist committees that shape tax provisions may be less
subject to political capture by intently focused interest groups
than the issue specific committees that shape other policy en-
actments. 160 The result is that policymakers have "increasingly
relied on the tax code rather than direct government expendi-
tures". 61 This increasing reliance is evidenced by the fact that
non-business tax expenditures rose from 4.2% of GDP in 1976
to 6.5% of GDP by 2001.162
156. See generally SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 14, at 101 (describing
that tax expenditures face less Congressional scrutiny than regular expendi-
tures by way of avoiding the regular budget process).
157. In 1990 and 1993, deficit reduction acts passed by Congress placed
limits on discretionary spending that made it relatively easier to enact tax
expenditures. Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 40 (citing Eugene Steuerle,
Tax Policy from 1990 to 2001, in American Economic Policy in the 1990s 139,
154 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & Peter R. Orzsag, eds., 2002)). President Obama
called for a three-year freeze in discretionary spending in 2010, and in his
2011 budget called for the freeze to be extended to five years.Jackie Calmes,
Obama Counters G.O.P. With Plan to Extend Spending Freeze, The New York
Times,Jan. 25, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/
26/us/politics/26fiscal.html.
158. Leonard Burman, Let's Freeze More Than Chump Change, THE WASHING-
TON PosT, Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/01/AR2010020103072.html.
159. See Steuerle, supra note 157, at 154.
160. Desai et al., supra note 28, at 10 (arguing further that "subsidies are
less likely to be inefficiently large if they are directed through the tax system
rather than in the form of direct subsidies.").
161. Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 39 (attributing this increase to
"perceived or real incentives" in the legislative process to enact policy
through the I.R.C., though not discussing those incentives in any detail).
162. Leonard Burman, Eric Toder & Christopher Geissler, How Big Are
Total Individual Income Tax Expenditures, and Who Benefits from Them? 5 (Tax
Policy Center Discussion Paper No. 31, Dec. 2008), available at http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001234_tax-expenditures.pdf. Non-
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Despite this expansion of tax expenditures, Batchelder
notes that while many refundable tax credits have been pro-
posed, the proposals have seldom been enacted; Batchelder
theorizes that this is because efficiency arguments have been
ignored.163 There are other reasons why refundable credits
may be spurned by Congress even though they are more effi-
cient than some of the alternatives. Most notably, refundable
credits are more costly budget items than are nonrefundable
credits or deductions. Because a refundable credit provides a
uniform subsidy, for it to have the same budget impact of a
deduction or nonrefundable credit, it either must be nomi-
nally smaller, or must necessarily be available to fewer taxpay-
ers. For policymakers who are reluctant supporters of a mea-
sure, or for any policymaker operating under strict budget
constraints (as is often and currently the case in Congress),
the effect of an item on the budget is an important considera-
tion. Where the benefit of an incentive is difficult to ascertain,
increasing the size of an incentive by making it refundable
may be unappealing, even if there is an associated efficiency
gain. Likewise, making a provision nonrefundable can in-
crease government revenues, though advocates of a given pol-
icy will be quick to point out that this is just a way to dilute the
effectiveness of the provision.
D. The Fairness of Tradable Tax Credits
Fairness - or equity - is another canon of tax policy analy-
sis. This section argues that tradable tax credits can match the
equity of refundable tax credits. The foundational assumption
of the progressive income tax, in which there are higher mar-
ginal rates for higher levels of income, is that those taxpaying
entities with greater income should pay more tax.164 The ex-
tent to which tax liability and income correspond is described
business tax expenditures are defined as "all tax expenditures reported on
individual income tax returns except those that affect taxes paid by business,
such as depreciation allowances and business tax credits." Id. at 4. From 1976
to 1985, non-business tax expenditures rose from 4.2% to 6.4%, then
dropped to 4.6% in 1990 thanks to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Id. at 4-5. By
2001, these tax expenditures topped out 6.5% of GDP, with the later reduc-
tion to 5.7% in 2006 attributed to lower marginal rates enacted in 2001. Id.
163. Batchelder et al., supra note 12, at 41-42.
164. See, e.g., MALMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 ("A fairness ideal based
on ability to pay underlies the income tax.").
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as vertical equity: where a taxpayer with high income pays less
income tax than a taxpayer with average income, the principal
of vertical equity is violated. 165 A corollary to vertical equity is
horizontal equity: similarly situated taxpayers with the same in-
come should pay the same amount of income tax.'@@
Tax expenditure literature has long warned against the "up-
side-down benefits" that occur when deductions, exemptions
and deferrals are used to incentivize behavior.167 When these
mechanisms are the basis of tax expenditures, taxpayers with
higher marginal rates receive greater benefits than taxpayers
in lower marginal rates. For example, a taxpayer in the 35%
income tax bracket will receive a benefit of $.35 for every dol-
lar of deduction received, whereas a taxpayer in the 15%
bracket who performs the exact same incentivized behavior to
the same extent will receive a benefit ofjust $.15 for each dol-
lar of deduction received.
Tradable tax credits address the upside-down benefit
problem.168 With a credit generally, the incentive does not
vary across different marginal tax rates. Taxpayers in the 35%
and 15% income tax brackets will receive a benefit of the
credit amount, creating a uniform incentive and eliminating
the upside-down subsidy effect. The size of the tax incentive
165. There are varied descriptions of vertical equity. Gruber describes it as
"the principle that groups with more resources (higher income, higher
wealth, higher profits) should pay higher taxes than do lower resource
groups." GRUBER, supa note 104, at 533. Although there is much to discuss
as far as the merits of the vertical equity criteria and various alternative ways
to consider vertical equity, it is assumed here that progressive marginal rates
in the tax code are to be maintained with the enactment of tax expendi-
tures.
166. Gruber defines horizontal equity as "the principle that individuals
who are similar [ly situated] but who make different economic or lifestyle
choices should be treated in the same way by the tax system." Id. This seems
to raise significant problems as far as tax expenditures are concerned: tax
incentives impose different levels of taxation for parties who take part in
certain behaviors.
167. See SURREY, supra note 18, at 136. Savings from deductions, exemp-
tions, and deferrals necessarily vary based on each taxpayer's marginal rate,
thus providing greater tax benefits to taxpayers with higher income.
168. See id. at 98 ("The credit device . .. does not involve the favoritism for
the well-to-do individual or large-size corporation that is built into the exclu-
sion or deduction device, since each taxpayer (with tax sufficient to absorb
the credit) obtains the same rate of initial assistance per dollar of receipt or
expenditure.").
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does not increase with income, thus a tradable credit does not
act as a countervailing force to progressive rates.169 Refund-
able credits and tradable credits add another advantage: they
do not vary even when the taxpayer has zero tax liability.1 7 0
This is a particularly important consideration in the taxation
of corporations: a subsidiary and an independent business in
the same industry may have equivalent income when viewed
alone, but face very different tax consequences depending on
the tax liability of the parent company. Tradable tax credits
allow both entities the same benefit from a tax incentive - and
the same incentive toward performing a particular behavior.'71
This leveling of the playing field, however, does cause
some further equity complications. As discussed in the LEED
certification example, some additional benefit, B,, must be
conferred on the construction company to prompt the trad-
able tax credit transaction. This benefit of tradable tax credits
may counteract progressivity because B is exploited by parties
with tax liability and so the benefit never goes to parties with-
out tax liability. Thus some benefit in a tradable tax credit
scheme flows to parties with greater resources as measured by
tax liability. Further, where the market for tradable tax credits
is discounted (tables 4 and 5 when a provides the building
owner with less money), the party purchasing the tradable
credit stands to benefit on the transaction, but will only be dif-
ferentiated from any similarly situated entities based on the
transaction spurred by the existence of a tax incentive. This
sort of tax liability reduction undermines vertical equity, and is
precisely the set of circumstances that led to political backlash
over safe harbor leasing and its quick repeal. 172 A tradable tax
credit thus must be structured to avoid providing a benefit to
169. See generally Jenn, supra note 18, at 563-65 (discussing horizontal eq-
uity and tax credits).
170. See supra note 24 and accompanying discussion. Nonrefundable cred-
its provide less of a benefit to taxpayers whose tax liability is less than the
credit amount.
171. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 74, at 1768-71 (discussing various
alternative ways to define competitive neutrality and thus to achieve the
same incentive across parties with different tax liability via transferability of
tax benefits).
172. See discussion supra Part 1I.B.3.
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sophisticated parties with large tax bills such that the principle
of vertical and horizontal equity might be violated.17 3
IV.
TRADABLE CREDITS IN PRACTICE
As the LEED certification example indicates, it is possible
to construct a scenario in which a tradable tax credit could
provide efficiency gains as compared to other forms of tax in-
centives. However, many complications arise in moving from a
highly simplified example to the reality of creating an effective
tax incentive in the form of a tradable tax credit. These com-
plications will necessarily be specific to the social or economic
policy goal underlying and giving rise to the tradable credit.
This section provides some general thoughts on real-world
concerns that may temper the usefulness of tradable tax cred-
its in practice.
A successful tradable tax credit regime must offer the pos-
sibility of welfare gains by way of creating a benefit (B) in ad-
dition to the positive externalities created by the activity being
incentivized. Thus there must be some benefit to a private
party for being associated with incentivized behavior, a benefit
that would not exist if the incentive were delivered directly by
the government. The LIHTC and NMTC, which provide low-
income housing and funding for development in low-income
neighborhoods respectively, are good examples of this effect.
In each case, the activity being incentivized has profit poten-
tial, but is also a public service and may fulfill other regulatory
obligations. For example, the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) requires certain financial institutions to lend in local
low-income communities.17 4 Businesses with expertise in the
incentivized activity have something to gain - goodwill and
meeting CRA obligations - from being associated with the
projects. And these businesses can apply their expertise in a
way that minimizes enforcement costs for government and so-
ciety. In contrast, there was no such effect in the safe harbor
leasing regime. Thus a good guideline for policymakers is to
determine whether the incentivized activity is associated with
public service or charitable projects, or somehow works in tan-
173. See discussion infra Part IV.
174. Desai et al., supra note 28, at 16-17. See supra note 114 (discussing
LIHTCs and the Community Reinvestment Act).
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dem with other policy goals. Of course, this is a very difficult
line to draw: almost every tax expenditure or proposed tax ex-
penditure is said to benefit the public somehow. Policymakers
will need to employ discriminating analysis to distinguish be-
tween policies that in fact benefit society as a whole and those
policies that are primarily beneficial to rent-seekers. Addition-
ally, policymakers should examine the extent to which imple-
mentation and enforcement of a policy requires expertise
most readily available in the private sector. Where there is
such overlap, it may be beneficial to involve and include vari-
ous interested parties by using a tradable tax credit regime.
Beyond efficiency concerns, policymakers should be
aware of the political constituency that is created by pairing
varied interests in a tradable tax credit regime. The right
formula - for example the developers and community finan-
cial institutions who mutually benefit from the LIHTC - can
create a strong coalition in support of a measure, but can also
make it difficult to alter or eliminate a tradable credit once
enacted. This is a double-edged sword that policymakers may
wield effectively to achieve policy goals that are otherwise out
of reach politically, but that can lead to entrenchment and
capture as well. The potential for a strong constituency - for
example linking groups with a social interest along with inves-
tors - exacerbates the risks of rent-seeking and misdirected re-
sources described above.
Finally, a successful tradable tax credit must be designed
with appreciation of the equity implications of the scheme.
Safe harbor leasing was quickly repealed because it seemed to
benefit only highly sophisticated corporations, and the com-
plexity of the mechanism created the appearance of gaming.
Similarly, the LIHTC market increasingly came to be domi-
nated by a small number of sophisticated investors. This drove
up the price of LIHTCs, which was beneficial to LIHTC
projects, but proved problematic when those investors simulta-
neously ended up with large losses and no tax liability to offset
in the recent recession.175 Policymakers should strive to make
the tradability transparent, with open markets and public pric-
ing similar to a publicly traded security, to ensure that the
players in a tradability regime need not be highly sophisti-
cated. If the benefits of tradable tax credits are widely availa-
175. See Timiraos, supra note 124.
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ble, and do not require significant sophistication, concerns
about tradable tax credits counteracting progressivity will be
unrealized. Further, open trading will minimize transaction
costs, maximizing the benefits of tradable tax credits, and will




Tradable tax credits have not received the same attention
from policymakers or academics that other forms of tax incen-
tives have garnered, even though tradable tax credits can be
the economic equivalent of refundable tax credits. In scena-
rios where the potential benefits of tradable tax credits may be
fully realized, for example the LEED certification scenario de-
scribed above in which a third party can benefit from the trad-
able tax credit structure, tradable tax credits can provide effi-
ciency benefits that other government interventions cannot
match. As policymakers engage in discussions about how to re-
form the I.R.C., tradable tax credits should not be cast aside as
merely a necessary political accommodation. Rather, policy-
makers should acknowledge and consider that tradable tax
credits can provide significant efficiency benefits as compared
to other forms of government intervention including other
forms of tax incentives. And in certain circumstances tradable
tax credits can surpass even refundable tax credits, the hereto-
fore preferred form of tax incentive, in efficiency. Tradable
tax credits accomplish this when an activity that creates a posi-
tive externality can provide an additional benefit to another
taxpaying entity. At the same time, tradable tax credits may be
more attractive than refundable tax credits and other forms of
government intervention in terms of enforcement costs and
political feasibility.
As Congress moves towards actually reforming the I.R.C.
for the first time in a quarter century, much attention will be
focused on reducing tax expenditures. To the extent that
some tax expenditures persist, or that in subsequent years fol-
lowing comprehensive reform, social and economic policy
once again creeps into the I.R.C., policymakers should strive
for provisions that are efficient and fair. Further, if past is pro-
logue, it is clear that an additional important - if not primary
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- consideration in developing and reforming tax expenditures
will be politics. Tradable tax credits offer potential benefits in
all of these key areas, and thus warrant further attention as a
viable and useful mechanism for shaping social and economic
policy through the tax code.
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